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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the determinants of bilateral bank ﬂows during the last two decades.
Speciﬁc focus is placed on the quantitative impact of composite and speciﬁci n s t i t u t i o n a l
arrangements in driving foreign bank capital. The empirical analysis reveals the following
key ﬁndings: 1) The empirical gravity model applies equally well in explaining ﬁnancial as
trade ﬂows. 2) Conditioned on standard gravity factors (distance, GDP, population), well-
functioning institutions is the single most important driving force for international bank
ﬂows. Speciﬁcally, foreign banks invest substantially more in countries with uncorrupt bu-
reaucracies, high-quality legal systems, and a non-government controlled banking system.
3) The European Integration process has almost doubled cross-border lending activities
between member states. These results are robust to various econometric methodologies
and are not driven by the substantial variation in institutional performance among in-
dustrial and developing nations. The results validate and complement recent evidence
on the key role of institutions on ﬁnancial patterns and economic development. The evi-
dence also oﬀer an empirical explanation to Lucas’ (1990) famous question of why capital
doesn’t ﬂow from rich to poor countries.
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1Non-technical Summary
One of the key and most controversial characteristics of the recent wave of globalization
has been the spike in cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows. Yet, the neoclassical prediction that
capital should move from wealthy to capital-scarce countries, where the expected capital
returns are high, has not been validated. Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1990) posed a famous
inquiry "why doesn’t capital ﬂy from rich to poor countries" and argued that productivity
and human capital diﬀerences can not explain the substantially low levels of foreign capital
ﬂows to emerging and underdeveloped countries.
Capital ﬂows have been recently regarded both as a remedy and a curse for emerging
economies economic setbacks. The unambiguous association of capital ﬂow volatility
with recent episodes of ﬁnancial turmoil have challenged the theoretically sound capital
ﬂows-development link. Understanding therefore the underlying factors that inﬂuence the
behavior of foreign investors is vital. In addition it is particularly useful to investigate
whether well-deﬁned and enforced institutions play any role in pulling foreign capital. For
example the IMF and the World Bank have constantly urged their members to implement
painful institutional reforms, tackle corruption, improve their bureaucracy and privatize
state-owned enterprises to attract foreign capital. In line with this reasoning are recent
models (e.g. Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002) that argue that a poorly operating legal
environment magniﬁes the agency costs of separation of ownership and control.
The aim of the present study is twofold. First, it identiﬁes the driving forces of cross-
border capital ﬂows and second it quantiﬁes the eﬀect of institutional arrangements in
the capital-recipient country in magnetizing foreign capital. It does that by empirically
studying bilateral capital ﬂows from banks located in nineteen developed countries to all
sectors (banking, private and public) in ﬁfty-ﬁve states.
The panel evidence are striking and very robust: 1) The institutions augmented gravity
equation that predicts that capital ﬂows between two countries are positively associated
to their "size" (population, GDP) and invesrely related to their "distance" (that captures
transaction and information costs) can explain more than half of the overall variability
in the volume of bilateral bank lending, 2) The role of institutions in attracting cross-
border bank capital is economically very large. A one percent increase in an indicator
2that measures the overall institutional quality in the capital recipient country is on av-
erage associated with a 2 percent spike in cross-border bank lending. Speciﬁcally, 3) an
uncorrupted and eﬃcient bureaucracy, 4) a high-quality legal environment, and 5) a non-
government controlled banking system in the recipient country are necessary conditions
for foreign investors (banks), when making their capital allocation decisions.
The empirical analysis also documents that 6) European Union (EU) membership
has almost doubled cross-border banking activities among member-states, 7) The quan-
titatively large institutional eﬀect applies both to developed and emerging countries. 8)
Finally, and in line with some previous studies, asset ﬂows tend to be complements with
liability ﬂows.
These results crucially contribute to the fast-growing literature on the determinants
of various types of capital ﬂows by showing that besides other factors (like distance,
level of GDP, ethnolinguistic ties) institutions in the recipient country are of foremost
importance. Therefore new theoretical work on international capital movements need
to directly model the institutional eﬀect. Second the ﬁndings add to the institutions,
law and ﬁnance research by demonstrating that the legal system, culture, bureaucratic
quality and corruption exert a signiﬁcant eﬀect not only to corporate ﬁnance patterns,
but also to the liquidity of ﬁnancial intermediaries in the capital recipient country. Third,
by establishing a strong institutions-capital ﬂows nexus, the empirical evidence hint to
a likely mechanism through which well-deﬁned and enforced institutions contribute to
economic growth.
The policy-implications of those results are also considerable: structural policies aim-
i n gt oi m p r o v ei n e ﬃcient bureaucracies, tackle corruption, and enhance legal system com-
petence seem to be rewarded by foreign banks, who invest substantially more in investor-
friendly countries. Therefore such policies can spur investment and growth opportunities,
by enhancing the liquidity of ﬁnancial intermediaries.
31 Introduction
This paper empirically investigates the determinants of cross-border bank ﬂows and quan-
tiﬁes the eﬀect of institutions on international banking activities. I augment the widely-
applied in international trade literature, "gravity equation" with both composite and
speciﬁc institutional measures, trying to answer the famous question posed by Robert
E. Lucas (1990), "why doesn’t capital ﬂy from rich to poor nations?" My results hint at
a very straightforward, yet not very pervasive answer: a poorly performing institutional
structure is a major impediment for foreign capital ﬂows.
Although this explanation might sound obvious, relevant empirical evidence on the
institutions-capital ﬂows nexus is limited. This is most likely due to both data unavail-
ability on bilateral capital ﬂows and on institutional performance, and the absence of
well-developed theory. The contribution of this paper is thus twofold: First, it con-
tributes to the nascent, but fast-growing, literature, on the determinants of international
capital movements (e.g. Razin, 2002, Portes and Rey, 2002) by studying the driving forces
of international banking activities. Second, it provides the ﬁrst comprehensive empirical
study of how the overall institutional environment and speciﬁc institutions impact foreign
(bank) capital.
Using quarterly observations on bilateral banking activities from nineteen ("source")
to ﬁfty-ﬁve ("recipient") countries from the mid-eighties until 2002, the panel regressions
reveal the following key results: 1) The institutions augmented gravity equation can ex-
plain more than half of the overall variability (in terms of R2) in bilateral bank ﬂows,
2) The role of institutions in attracting cross-border bank ﬂows is not only statistically
signiﬁcant, but also economically very large. A one percent increase in the overall insti-
tutional quality index in the capital recipient country is associated with a more than 2
percent escalation in the volume of bilateral bank lending. Speciﬁcally, when I decompose
the eﬀect of the institutional structure in recipient country, the results show that: 3) an
uncorrupted and eﬃcient bureaucracy are necessary for magnetizing foreign capital, and
4) foreign investors appear unwilling to invest in countries with ineﬃcient legal systems,
most likely because agency costs are ampliﬁed. Quantitatively a 5 per cent improvement
in a measure of judicial eﬃciency in the capital receiving country is followed by a one per
cent rise in bilateral bank ﬂows. 5) Government ownership and control of the banking
sector strongly hamper foreign investment in the banking sector. 6) International institu-
4tions are similarly quite important for foreign lending. European Union (EU) membership
has almost doubled cross-border banking activities among member-states. These results
are robust to various econometric methodologies and the quantitatively large institutional
eﬀect applies both to developed (OECD) and developing (non-OECD) countries.
International capital movements have skyrocketed in the last decades and have be-
come the major source of ﬁnance for most developing countries. There are ample ev-
idence and numerous theoretical models stressing the importance of foreign credit and
ﬁnancial globalization on economic performance. Identifying and quantifying what deter-
mines the volume of international capital ﬂows is therefore of vital importance. Foreign
capital can drastically impact economic performance through various mechanisms. First,
consistent with the neoclassical tradition (e.g. Lucas, 1990), empirical evidence (e.g.
Bosworth and Collins, 1999; Razin, 2002) demonstrate that capital ﬂows boost domestic
investment. Capital-scarce countries need foreign credit to relax domestic ﬁrm ﬁnancing
constraints, lower the cost of ﬁnance and enable high-quality monitoring of managers
and entrepreneurs (Obstfeld, 1998). Moreover, a high volume of international banking
activities enhances the liquidity of domestic ﬁnancial intermediaries, which in turn fosters
investment and growth (e.g. Loyaza, Beck, and Levine, 2002; Beck and Levine, 2003).
Second, ﬁnancial integration can spur growth by increasing diversiﬁcation opportunities
(Obstfeld, 1994; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997). Third, capital ﬂows enable countries
to ﬁnance international trade and realize the gains of specialization (Rose and Spiegel,
2003).1
In the era of globalization, capital ﬂows have been regarded both as an anathema
and as a panacea for developing countries’ structural problems. While the capital ﬂows-
growth nexus is diﬃcult to challenge on a theoretical basis (see Prasad et al., 2003 for
some "mixed" empirical results), there is evidence (e.g. Frankel and Rose, 1996) pointing
out a link between foreign capital ﬂows and recent ﬁnancial crises.2 Understanding the
driving forces of foreign capital movements, can also help us explain the large capital ﬂow
reversals during a crisis and the reasons behind their high volatility.
1For a review on the "direct" and "indirect" channels of ﬁnancial integration on growth see Prasad,
Rogoﬀ, Wei, and Kose (2000). They also document that capital ﬂows do not necessarily cause higher
growth (although the correlation between growth and capital ﬂo w si sp o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant).
2Frankel and Rose (1996), Obstfeld (1998). For theoretical models see Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee
(2001) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002).
51.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to three distinguishable areas of research (see Graph 1 for a graphical
illustration).
First is the literature on the determinants of cross-border capital ﬂows. The gravity
model which predicts that foreign capital movements between two countries are posi-
tively related to the size (level of GDP, population) of each country and inversely related
to their distance has served as the benchmark for most recent studies on international
capital ﬂows. Distance proxies for information and other indirect costs, while size captures
diversiﬁcation opportunities. Portes, Oh, and Rey (2001), Portes and Rey (2002), and
Mody, Sadka, and Razin (2003) show that the gravity speciﬁcation works quite well in ex-
plaining cross-border debt, equity and FDI ﬂows respectively.3 Similarly Buch (2002) and
Rose and Spiegel (2003) show that the gravity model performs equally well in explaining
international banking activities. Although information costs could also be correlated with
poorly performing institutions, current research has, however, not focused on institutional
role. One notable exception is the work of Shang-Jin Wei (Wei, 2001; Wei and Wu, 2001;
Wei and Gelos, 2002); he investigates how corruption and low-transparency in the re-
cipient country inﬂuence foreign investors behavior. The present study supplements this
literature by examining the driving forces and by quantifying the key role of institutional
factors of international bank ﬂows. The results stress the need for future theoretical work
linking institutions with international capital movements. In addition, future empirical
studies need to incorporate the institutional role on international capital movements.
Second it contributes to the burgeoning institutions and growth literature. Although,
there is little doubt that well-functioning institutional arrangements promote economic
growth (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1997, Hall and Jones, 1999, Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2001), there is still little empirical evidence on how the institutions-growth
nexus works. My analysis provides robust results for a strong institution-capital ﬂow nexus
and as such reveals a mechanism through which institutional performance contributes to
economic development. Since the ﬁnance and development (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck
and Levine, 2003) and the capital ﬂows and growth (e.g. Bosworth and Collins, 1999)
studies have empirically established that ﬁnancial intermediaries’ liquidity and high levels
3A distinct literature has focused on US banks’ international extension of credit (e.g. Goldberg and
Johnson, 1990; Dahl and Shrieves, 1999). Institutions are absent from those studies, which primarily
focus on macro developments in the United States and recipient countries.
6of foreign capital crucially contribute to economic growth.4, the empirical evidence reveal
an important mechanism through which institutions can foster growth.
Third, the results add to the fast-growing literature on the role of institutions on
ﬁnance. Hayek (1960) argued that the common law tradition oﬀers investors and entre-
preneurs a more ﬂexible and adaptable business environment. In a series of inﬂuential
papers, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2002) have empirically veriﬁed this argument
and established a causal eﬀect of investor protection to ﬁnance. Well-deﬁned and properly
enforced creditor and shareholder rights appear to be a prerequisite for liquid and active
capital markets (La Porta et al. 1997, Burger and Warnock, 2004), merger and acquisition
activity (Rossi and Volpin, 2002), and large project ﬁnance deals (Esty and Megginson,
2003). The present study demonstrates that legal eﬃciency and well-enforced institutions
are also a necessary condition for international banking activities.5
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section, I discuss the theo-
retical background of my empirical study. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology
and the data. Section 4 provides a preliminary analysis of the panel descriptives, while
4Speciﬁcally, Levine, Loyaza and Beck (2000) provide evidence that ﬁnancial development is associated
with higher productivity and faster capital accumulation. Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Claessens and
Leuven (2004) use industry level data to document that ﬁnancial development promotes growth by
relaxing market imperfections and reducing the cost of ﬁnance, especially to capital intense ﬁrms. For a
review of the ﬁnance and growth literature, see Levine (2003). Likewise, Razin (2002), and Bosworth and
Collins (1999) show that capital ﬂows have a robust causal eﬀect on domestic investment and growth.
Both studies document that besides FDI, which has the largest positive impact on the economy among
all types of capital ﬂows, bank lending (loan ﬂows) contributes to growth and investment more than
portfolio inﬂows.
5The law and ﬁnance and the associated corporate governance literature has taken a contractual
approach to ﬁnance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), which is seen as a nexus of incomplete contracts. Well-
functioning institutions are required to mitigate the agency problem caused by the separation of ownership
and control and promote ﬁnancial development. Foreign investors typically face greater agency costs due
to remoteness, linguistic barriers and asymmetric information. My results support the intuition that
an eﬃcient legal environment is important for international investors by showing a strong preference of
foreign banks to invest in investor friendly and uncorrupt countries.
7section 5 presents and confers the main regression results. In section 6, I quantify the
eﬀect of particular institutional arrangements (namely the law, corruption, government
ownership of banks, and European Union membership) on cross-border bank ﬂows and
show that institutional performance applies to both developed and emerging countries.
In section 7, I perform some necessary robustness checks, while in section 8 I summarize
and conclude.
2 Theoretical Background
International economics theory has not modelled institutions explicitly, but has analyzed
them in the broad context of transaction costs. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) present a
model that generates substantial levels of portfolio home bias by introducing transaction
costs solely in the goods market. These costs are however unlikely to fully account for the
large levels of portfolio home bias6.M a r t i na n dR e y( forthcoming 2004) build a representa-
tive agent model introducing frictions in the asset market.7 An empirical gravity equation
for ﬁnancial ﬂows arises naturally from these models, which allow one to include asym-
metric information and ineﬃcient institutional arrangements in their transaction costs.8
My results support this theoretical prediction, since population, ﬁnancial development,
and distance (which proxies for information costs) enter the regressions with coeﬃcients
that are both consistent with theory and statistically signiﬁcant. Although Martin and
Rey (forthcoming 2004) and the related empirical work of Portes and Rey (2002) focus
on costs arising from asymmetric information, institutions can also mitigate or amplify
asset trade frictions. For example, a high quality legal system minimizes monitoring costs;
corporate transparency and advanced accounting standards mitigate information costs;
bureaucratic and judicial eﬃciency similarly alleviate agency costs by settling disputes
arising from contract incompleteness.
6This was a major critique to Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ’s paper. See the discussion, particularly Charles
Engel’s (2000) comments.
7In Martin and Rey model, demand for country A’s assets is separated between domestic and external.
External demand from country B for assets in A is inversely related to (asset) transaction costs. These
costs include ﬁnancial intermediaries’ fees and hedging expenses, along with information and consequently
monitoring costs. In addition, demand from country B for assets in A are a function of the size of domestic
(country A) capital markets, since a larger market implies better diversiﬁcation opportunities. Finally,
ﬂows from B to A are larger the larger the population in B.
8In the discussion of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000), Maurice Obstfeld admitted that trade costs can be
interpreted quite broadly, including language costs and legal system ineﬃciencies.
8Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) in contrast directly model legal system eﬀectiveness on
ﬁnancial patterns. They build an agency model where an entrepreneur has a proﬁtable
project and seeks external ﬁnance. The entrepreneur maximizes her personal wealth,
which is a function of the fraction of the project she decides to maintain, the project’s
proﬁtability, and the amount she is able to divert. Diversion in turn depends on the eﬃ-
cacy of the legal system. Looting becomes costly with well-deﬁned investor’s rights and
especially with an eﬃcient judiciary that safeguards those rights. Investors, ex ante, antic-
ipate this behavior and are unwilling to invest in low quality legal environment countries.
Investor-unfriendly countries are therefore characterized by concentrated ownership and
underdeveloped equity markets.9 This model also provides a theoretical answer to Lucas’
question (1990): capital does not ﬂow to countries with low levels of investor protection.
Large agency costs make the eﬀective production technology less eﬃcient and as a result
foreign investors (banks in the present study) are unwilling to lend to countries marked
by a poorly functioning legal system. My results demonstrate a strong causal eﬀect of
numerous legal system eﬀectiveness indicators to the level of cross—border lending activ-
ities and therefore, oﬀer the ﬁrst comprehensive empirical validation for this theoretical
prediction..
3 Methodology and Data
I use a similar methodology to that of previous works on the determinants of cross-border
trade and asset ﬂows. Buch (2000) and Rose and Spiegel (2003) study the eﬀect of Basel-
driven legislation and trade linkages on international banking activities respectively. Their
results suggest that a gravity model should be the benchmark of any similar analysis on
cross-border bank lending.
3.1 Gravity Equation
The benchmark speciﬁcation for my analysis on the drivers of international banking ac-
tivities takes the following form:
9These results are in line with the empirical evidence presented by La Porta et al. (1997, 1999).
9ln(Fi,j,t)=β1 ln(GDPi,t/POPi,t ∗ GDPj,t/POPj,t)+β2 ln(POPi,t ∗ POP j,t)
+β3 ln(AREAi ∗ AREAj)+β4 ln(DISTi,j)+β5TIE i,j + β6BORDERi,j
+γINSTj,t + δRATEi,t + ΨOTHERj,t + at + εi,j,t (1)
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of gross ﬂows from banks located in
country i to all sectors in country j in period (quarter) t. ln(GDPi,t/POPi,t∗GDPj,t/POPj,t),
is the logarithm of the product of per capita GDP converted to US dollars in the source
(i) and host country (j) respectively. ln(POPi,t ∗POPj,t) is the logarithm of the product
of populations in the two countries in quarter t, while ln(AREAi ∗ AREAj) denotes the
log of the product of land areas (in square kilometers). These variables are included to
capture the "size eﬀect". Speciﬁcally, per capita GDP proxies for the level of ﬁnancial
and economic development10, while population for the market-size of the two countries.
DISTi,j denotes the distance between the two countries and TIE i,j is a dummy variable
that takes the value one when the two countries have common colonial history or speak
t h es a m el a n g u a g e . 11 The speciﬁcation also includes a border dummy (BORDERi,j),
which equals one if the two countries are adjacent. The employed empirical model (1)
mimics the speciﬁcation used by Glick and Rose (2002), and Rose (2003a, 2003b).12
INSTj,t is the composite institutions index (to be discussed in the following subsection)
o ft h er e c i p i e n tc o u n t r y ,j. If in line with theory, institutional performance is important
for attracting foreign capital, we expect the γ coeﬃcient to be positive and signiﬁcant. In
Section 6 I decompose the aggregate institutional indicator with speciﬁcm e a s u r e s( l e g a l
system eﬃcacy, corruption, bureaucratic quality, and government ownership of banks) to
quantify how each of these factors aﬀects the level of cross-border bank ﬂows.
RATEi,t is the interest rate (discount or lending rate) in recipient country; it is cap-
10C l e a r l yo n ec o u l dc o m eu pw i t hb e t t e rp r o x i e so fﬁnancial development (market capitalization, do-
mestic credit to GDP, etc.). GDP is preferred due to data availability and comparability with previous
studies (IFS database does not include market capitalization and private credit at a quarterly basis even
for many developed countries).
11It is common in the trade literature to include numerous variables that measure ethno-linguistic
ties rather than aggregate them. Including distinct dummies for common language, common country,
common colonizer, or other type of ethno-linguistic relationship (e.g. Glick and Rose, 2002) does not
alter the results.
12Employing the size variables in the source and recipient country distinctly (e.g. Portes and Rey, 2002,
Mody, Razin and Sadka, 2002,) instead of their products yields almost identical results. These results
a r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
10turing macroeconomic developments in industrial countries. OTHERj,t is a vector of
additional controls for economic conditions in the recipient country (j). It includes vari-
ables, such as inﬂation, GDP growth, etc. Finally, to control for unobserved world eﬀects
a n dt h eu p w a r dt r e n do ng l o b a lc a p i t a lﬂows, I include period (year, quarter) ﬁxed eﬀects
(at).
3.2 Data
My dataset consists of quarterly observations, starting from the ﬁrst quarter of 1984 until
the end of 2002. The observations include bank ﬂow data from nineteen "source"-lending
countries (i)t oﬁfty-ﬁve recipient nations (j). The "source" countries are ﬁnancially
developed nations while recipient countries include both OECD and developing (and some
underdeveloped) states. A full list with all sample countries is provided in Appendix A.
The data can be separated into three categories: 1) the cross-border bank ﬂow data,
Fi,j,t, 2) institutional performance measures, INSTj,t (composite and speciﬁc), and 3)
data on other controls. In this sub-section I brieﬂy discuss the Bank of International
Settlements (BIS) capital ﬂow data and institutional performance indicators. A complete
list with all variables employed, source, and a brief description are included in Appendix
B.
3.2.1 Dependent Variable - Bank Flows
Data on bank ﬂows is taken from the Bank of International Settlement’s (BIS) Inter-
national Locational Banking Statistics (IBS). The BIS IBS database reports aggregate
assets (and liabilities) of banks in 32 jurisdictions ("the reporting area") in more than
100 countries ("the vis-à-vis countries").13 Data includes on-balance sheet exposure and
captures cross-border loans and deposits, debt securities, and other assets, ﬂo w i n gt oa l l
sectors (banking and non-banking) in the recipient country (j). Flows are estimated by
the BIS as the exchange rate adjusted changes in total assets (and liabilities).14 Due to
13Data includes assets and liabilities for non-residents plus assets and liabilities for residents, denom-
inated in foreign currency. The dataset has many gaps, especially in underdeveloped and emerging
countries.
14A concern with previous versions of the BIS data was how to construct ﬂows from the stock data.
Simply taking ﬁrst diﬀerences could be very misleading, since a devaluation either at the source or the
recipient country might cause a sharp increase or decrease in total assets, even if no capital movements take
place. Since reporting countries report the currency in which the assets and liabilities are denominated,
11insuﬃcient coverage for 13 (mainly developing and "oﬀ-shore" centres) countries I am left
with 19 "source" (i) countries.15 However, due to the hub nature of international bank-
ing activities, the data covers almost all international bank lending.16 The BIS dataset
has not been heavily explored, most likely due to some limitations in earlier versions. In
recent releases, however, the BIS has addressed most of its previous problems17 and data
q u a l i t yh a sd r a s t i c a l l yi m p r o v e d . 18
3.2.2 Composite & Speciﬁc Institutional Indicators
Most indexes that measure legal eﬃciency, corruption, and other institutional arrange-
ments are either purely cross country or exhibit limited time variability. While this is not
a problem per se, an indicator ideally should also exhibit time variability to capture the
dynamic eﬀect of improved institutional arrangements on bank lending. Therefore, for my
benchmark estimates I use the composite institutional index constructed by Political Risk
Services (PRS),19 namely the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) "political risk"
indicator. This indicator exhibits quarterly variability and can be directly merged with
the BIS quarterly data. In addition it starts in the early eighties (1984), perfectly match-
ing BIS starting date.20 The "Political Risk" indicator is a composite index of political,
legal, social, and bureaucratic institutions. It is based on PRS staﬀ subjective assessment
of various institutional arrangements and ranges from zero to one hundred, with lower
values suggesting poorly performing institutions. Panel A of Appendix B provides a de-
the BIS has constructed an estimate of the ﬂows, which I employ as my dependent variable. As the BIS
acknowledge, this adjusting is not perfect, since ﬂows might have occurred at diﬀerent exchange rates (see
for more details Wooldridge, 2002). However, it is the best proxy possible and far better than attempts
to individually construct ﬂows (e.g. Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).
15These countries started reporting international banking activities after 2000.
16The BIS reports that countries are asked to contribute only "....when their cross—border banking
business becomes substantial." (p.5. BIS 2003b)
17For example after mid-2002 the BIS has made adjustments for measurement diﬀerences across coun-
tries. It has also recently added some oﬀ-balance sheet items, such as "trustee business". For more
details, see BIS (2003a,b) and Wooldridge (2002).
18Unfortunately there are many zeros in the data, which makes the logarithmic transformation impos-
sible. In the robustness section, I address the excess zeros and missing observations problem and show
that the importance of institutions in cross-border bank ﬂows is very robust. Other limitations of the
dataset, -which are common to most capital ﬂows studies- are: i) the data does not capture indirect
exposure to recipient countries, and ii) insuﬃcient coverage of "oﬀ-balance sheet" exposure.
19Political Risk Services, is a risk rating corporation that assess investment risk at a particular country.
So although measurement error might be present, it is exactly the type of data that institutional investors,
like banks in this sample, take into account, when making their asset allocation and lending decisions.
20Actually the BIS dataset starts in 1977. Data coverage during the ﬁrst decade, however, is limited
to a couple of industrial countries.
12tailed list of the individual components of the index. PRS also produce an "Economic"
and a "Financial Risk" assessment based on speciﬁc macroeconomic, trade, and ﬁnancial
sector developments. Since I use those indicators to proxy and control for macroeconomic
developments, panel A of appendix B also reports their components.
Gelos and Wei (2002) and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2003) have used the
ICRG indexes to study the impact of institutions on foreign investor’s behavior. However
both studies use averages and therefore don’t utilize the time variability; moreover these
studies do not concentrate on bilateral ﬂows as the present study does. To my knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst paper that links cross-border capital ﬂows with these indexes in a panel
data framework. These indexes have been used in the ﬁnance literature by Erb, Harvey,
and Viskanta (1996a, 1996b) and Perotti and Van Oijen (2001). The former study ﬁnd
that the risk indicators are correlated with future stock and bond returns , while the
latter show that political risk is strongly related to stock market turnover.21 The empir-
ical growth literature has also used components of the ICRG product with considerable
success. Examples include the classical growth studies of Knack and Keefer (1995) and
Hall and Jones (1999).22
Since the aim of the paper is not only to investigate the driving forces and institutional
role on driving cross-border capital ﬂows, but also to identify and quantify which type of
institutional arrangements are of foremost importance, I use other variables that directly
measure legal system eﬃciency, bureaucratic quality, and corruption.23 Speciﬁcally, I use
the widely-used anti-director’s rights index, compiled by La Porta et al. (1998) to measure
the de jure quality of laws in place. For the actual, de facto, performance of the legal
system I rely on three variables from the recent work of Djankov et al. (2002, 2003).
These are i) a measure of contract enforceability, ii) t h et i m ei tt a k e st oe v i c tat e n a n tf o r
non-payment, and iii) the time it takes to start up a new business. Djankov et al. (2003)
show that these variables, which exhibit substantial cross-country variability, are good
21Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996a) give detailed correlations and a lucid analysis of the diﬀerent
available indicators of country risk. ICRG measures are not only the best in explaining expected equity
and bond returns, but are also the only indicators that exhibit quarterly variability.
22These papers decompose the ICRG "political risk" index and use only the scores on i) law and
order, ii) bureaucratic quality, iii) corruption, iv) risk of expropriation, and v) government repudiation
of contracts. Hall and Jones name their composite index Government Anti-diversion policies index. The
index I use is broader since it includes religious tensions, war, ethnic conﬂict, etc. For more details see
Panel of Appendix B.
23See Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) for an eﬀort to "unbundle" institutions and empirically quantify
the impact of speciﬁc institutional characteristics on economic development.
13proxies for the operational performance of the legal system and bureaucratic quality.24
For corruption I use an aggregate index compiled by Transparency International.
3.2.3 Other
Common language, ethno-linguistic, and geographical variables that are included in (1)
originally come from the CIA Factbook and have been taken from Andrew Rose’s web-
page.25 GDP, population and other macro variables are taken from IMF’s International
Financial Statistics. European Union (EU) and OECD entry dates are taken from the
webpages of these organizations.
4 Descriptive Analysis
Figure 1 shows a scatter-plot of the (cross-time) mean of aggregate bank ﬂows (in assets)
relative to the (mean) level of GDP in the recipient country (j) .T h es i z ee ﬀect appears
remarkably strong. Richer and ﬁnancially developed countries engage more in cross-border
bank lending activities. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics, while Table 2 provides
the correlation matrix of the variables employed. Cross-country institutional performance
diﬀers enormously. For example, Canada, Chile, and the United Kingdom get a score of
5 in the (zero to six scale) anti-director’s rights index, while Belgium gets a zero, while
Germany and Italy get a disappointing one. The variability of the de facto legal quality
indicators (contract enforceability and tenant eviction time) is even higher. For example
in ten sample-countries26 i tt a k e sm o r et h a nay e a rt oe n f o r c eo n eo ft h es i m p l e s tl e g a l
cases, tenant eviction for nonpayment.
The correlation structure suggests a notable association between the composite insti-
tutional index and bank ﬂows. The ICRG "political risk" index is substantially correlated
with ﬂows both in assets and in liabilities (correlations of 0.31 and 0.34 respectively). Fig-
ure 2 plots the cross country scatter of aggregate bank ﬂows against the mean composite
institutions index. There is a clear positive association.
24Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) use the "legal formalism" indicator, also compiled by Djankov et. al
(2003), as a proxy for the quality of contracting institutions-law; the results are robust to the use of this
index.
25Note that I have corrected some mistakes in the original dataset as reported in Andrew Rose’s web
page.
26Argentina, Japan, Italy, Poland, Austria, Bulgaria, Colombia, Israel, Norway, and Hungary.
14The composite institutional index is, in turn, highly correlated with corruption and
contract enforceability (correlations above 0.70), although these factors enter with just a
4% loading (see Appendix B). Its correlation with the other legal and political institutional
variables is much lower. Since the aim is to identify which type of institutions magnetize
foreign capital, ﬁgures 3, 4 and 5 plot contract enforceability, corruption and bureaucratic
quality measures against aggregate bank ﬂows. All ﬁgures suggest a positive association
between well-functioning institutions and international banking activities.
The composite institutional index ranges from 33 (in the Philippines in the ﬁrst quarter
of 1991) to 97 (in Switzerland and the Netherlands in various periods). The within
country variability, which is particularly desirable in a panel context, is also substantial:
The Philippines, for example, begin in 1984 with a very low score of 38 (out of 100). It
then experiences a notable institutional improvement and reaches a score of 76 at the end
of 1997 and then fall to 65 (in the last quarter of 2002). Figure 6 further explores the
time-variation of the aggregate institutions indicator. It shows the evolution of the ICRG
"political risk" index in the Philippines together with the volume of cross-border lending
by US banks (which is the largest creditor to this country) from 1984 till the end of 2002.
It is evident that after the substantial improvement of political institutions in the late
eighties, capital started to ﬂow to Philippines at a much higher rate than before. Although
the Philippines was aﬀected by all three major developing countries’ ﬁnancial crises in the
nineties (Tequila crisis of 1994, the East Asian crisis of 1997, and the contagious Russian
default in 1998-9), improved institutions attracted foreign investor’s funds.
5R e s u l t s
I begin the regression analysis estimating (1) using plain (cross-section time-series) OLS. I
then move to more elaborate panel-data techniques. Although it is common for estimates
to diﬀer substantially depending on the estimation methodology,27 t h eg r a v i t yf a c t o r sa n d
institutional measures appear remarkably robust, especially regarding their statistical
signiﬁcance. Throughout the regression analysis, t statistics based on standard errors
adjusted for clustered panel-wise (country pairs) heteroskedasticity are reported.
In this section I concentrate on the time-varying aggregate (composite) institutions
27See for example Rose (2003).
15index (ICRG "political risk" indicator), while in the next section I try to "unbundle"i n -
stitutions and estimate the eﬀect of particular institutional arrangements on cross-border
bank lending.
5.1 Pooled OLS
Table 3 presents the benchmark OLS estimates. The gravity model works pretty well in
explaining bilateral bank ﬂows. Although the ﬁt is not as good as in the trade literature
(where the R2 is around 0.65), we can explain more than forty percent of the overall
variability in bilateral bank ﬂows just with standard gravity factors, namely distance,
ethnolinguistic ties, land area, income, population and per capita GDP. I present several
perturbations in Panel A of Table 3 (and in subsequent tables). The standard gravity
regressors consistently enter with stable and well-behaved coeﬃcients. Distance enters
with a coeﬃcient around −0.6 to −0.8, which is close, yet smaller than that in recent
papers examining trade ﬂows.28 Although it might be puzzling to interpret a negative
eﬀect of distance to asset trade, since transaction fees are typically small, distance seems
to proxy well for information asymmetries and other non-standard costs.29 Similarly the
coeﬃcient for the logarithm of the product of land areas between the two countries is
around −0.2, close to the results of Rose (2003a, 2003b). As predicted by theory (Martin
and Rey, 2003) and along with previous studies on equity (Portes and Rey, 2002) and
FDI ﬂows (Mody, Razin, and Sadka, 2003) the coeﬃcients on the other size measures are
positive and signiﬁcant. Richer and more ﬁnancially developed nations (proxied by the
log of per capita GDP) engage much more in cross-border lending activities as do larger
-in terms of population- countries30. So in spite of the neoclassical model prediction,
capital not only doesn’t ﬂow to poor nations, but is directed towards relatively wealthy
nations. Martin and Rey (forthcoming 2004) attribute this peculiar result to increased
diversiﬁcation opportunities in richer nations, while Gertler and Rogoﬀ (1990) argue that
28Buch, Kleinert, and Toubal (2003) provide a thorough review of both the theoretical foundations and
recent empirical results on the impact of distance on bilateral trade and asset ﬂows.
29Portes and Rey (2002) show that when other factors that more directly capture information costs
(telephone traﬃc, foreign newspapers sales) enter an equity ﬂows gravity speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient of
distance decreases substantially (although it is still negative and signiﬁcant).
30The only standard gravity variable that does not enter positively and signiﬁcantly (as it does in
the empirical trade analyses) is the common border dummy. Yet this is not puzzling, since we expect
adjacency to be much more important in goods trade. For comparability with previous studies I maintain
the common border dummy in all the speciﬁcations, although it is always insigniﬁcant. Excluding the
common border dummy yields identical coeﬃcients to all other regressors.
16because wealth can serve as collateral, capital market imperfections are mitigated in
aﬄuent countries.
Columns (2), (3) and (4) add the composite institutional index to the gravity equation.
I use the natural logarithm of the composite institutional indicator to directly interpret
the coeﬃcient as elasticity.31 Not only is the γ coeﬃcient statistically signiﬁcant, but
its magnitude is economically very large. Its scale implies that a one percent increase
(decrease) in institutional eﬃciency is followed by a rise (decline) of approximately 3.5
percent in the level of international banking activities. This eﬀect appears remarkably
large. A country that experiences an institutional improvement from a score of 50 to 55,
as it happened in Argentina in 1984-5, is expected to experience an increase in bilateral
lending of 35 percent.32 The ﬁt of the model has substantially increased and the R2
has jumped from 0.45 to 0.50. In columns (3) and (4) I also control for macroeconomic
developments both in the "source" (i) and the "recipient" (j) country. Numerous studies
(Calvo, Leiderman, Reinhart 1993, 1994; Frankel and Roubini, 2001) have documented
as i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect of global interest rates on "North to South" capital ﬂows. Consistent
with these evidence, the coeﬃcient on the lending rate in the source country is signiﬁcantly
negative, suggesting that periods of high interest rates in the industrial world are indeed
associated with lower levels of bank lending activities. Note that the coeﬃcient on the
composite institutions index has not changed and is still signiﬁcantly positive.
A particular concern can arise due to omitted variables in the recipient country (j).
Most previous work on the determinants of cross-border capital ﬂows has failed to ﬁnd
signiﬁcant macroeconomic factors in the recipient country that drive foreign capital. One,
however, could argue that the composite institutions indicator captures (at least in part)
a poorly performing economic environment. Although I further address omitted variables
concerns in the sensitivity analysis section (Section 7), in column (4), I add inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
recipient country (j). The speciﬁcation also includes a high income and regional dummies
to control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity.33 The coeﬃcient on inﬂation is neg-
ative and signiﬁcant, but extremely small in magnitude. Other macroeconomic controls
31The results are very similar when I use the actual vaue (instead of the natural logarithm) of the
composite indicator. These results are available upon request.
32In the ﬁrst quarter of 1984 Argentina had a score of 50. However after the end of the military
dictatorship and the Falklands war (1984), Argentina experienced a fast institutional improvement. So
at the fourth quarter of 1984, Argentina received a score of 55, while at the end of 1985 a score of 58.
33The high income and the regional dummies comes from World-Bank’s country classiﬁcation.
17such as growth appear insigniﬁcant, conﬁrming previous studies.34 The γ coeﬃcient on
the institutional index has only marginally decayed and retains its statistical signiﬁcance,
implying that even after controlling for gravity factors, regional characteristics and macro
developments, well-functioning institutions signiﬁcantly aﬀect the volume of international
capital ﬂows.
In ﬁgure 7 I try to further clarify how vital is institutional quality for international
banking activities. The dotted line plots the predicted evolution of bank lending from US
banks to the Philippines, if the Philippines had not experienced the substantial institu-
tional improvement after the late eighties. In contrast the solid line plots the predicted
foreign bank lending with the actual institutions score in each period, while the volatile
dashed line plots the real level of gross cross—border lending (in log terms). The simulated
time-series when the Philippines had the initial institutions index clearly underpredicts the
actual lending activities, while the predicted series on the real institutional performance
has a much better ﬁt.
5.2 Alternative Estimators
The second panel of Table 3 presents the benchmark results based on alternative panel
methodologies. The ﬁrst column reports Tobit estimates. Truncation is a concern, since
by construction the level of bilateral lending cannot take negative values, and is in fact
quite often zero.35 Substantial variability, however, yields Tobit estimates almost identical
to OLS. The composite institutions index has still a highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, which
suggests that a one percent improvement in the institutional index is followed by a more
than 2 percent (γ =2 .3) increase in cross—border bank lending activities. Column (2)
reports the "between" estimation results. Although this estimation removes the time
series dimension (by using mean values), it is useful to identify which countries receive
on average the bulk of international bank capital. The estimated coeﬃcients imply an
even larger eﬀect of institutions to the level of bilateral bank lending activities, which is
consistent with the recent cross-sectional results of Alfaro et al. (2003) on the fundamental
34Frankel and Roubini (2001) describe this peculiar ﬁnding as follows: "....(research) came to a sur-
prising conclusion: the most important identiﬁable factors behind the ﬂows were US interest rates and
other macroeconomic variables external to the emerging market countries. Capital was heading South
because low rates of return were on oﬀer in the North. This was a surprising conclusion because the
more common belief at the time was that domestic factors within the emerging market countries were
responsible, particularly pro-market policy reforms.."
35I address the problem of zeros in the sensitivity analysis section (Section 7.2).
18role of institutional quality in explaining why capital doesn’t ﬂy to poor nations..
An important policy question is whether foreign investors (banks) "reward" structural
policies that improve the institutional environment, through increased lending. The ﬁxed-
eﬀects "within" estimator tries to directly answer this enquiry. The "within"c o e ﬃcients
should be interpreted cautiously, since this estimation ignores time invariant factors, such
as distance, ethnolinguistic ties, while we ex ante know that these factors are important
for explaining cross-border lending. Yet, the coeﬃcient on the composite institutional
index is still positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that institutional advancement indeed
yields increased international bank ﬂows.
Another approach, which fully utilizes the panel information, would be to estimate
a FGLS random-eﬀects model. This approach introduces country-pair ﬁxed-eﬀects, but
also allows for time invariant regressors. Random-eﬀect estimates are typically more
eﬃcient, since they use information both "between"a n d" within" panels. However, their
consistency crucially relies on the assumption that country-pair eﬀects are not correlated
with the disturbances.36 Random-eﬀect estimates are given in column (8). The statistical
signiﬁcance of all regressors has not changed, although their magnitude has somewhat
decreased. The eﬀect of institutions’ is still highly signiﬁcant, although their eﬀect has
somewhat decreased: a one percent institutional improvement is followed by a 0.5 percent
increase in cross-border lending volume.37
5.3 Dynamic Analysis
Another important econometric consideration concerns the structure of the error term.
Since ﬂows are estimated by the BIS as the exchange rate adjusted change in total assets,
ﬁrst-diﬀerencing might lead to an autocorrelated error term, which would in turn lead to
biased estimators.38 Table 4 reports estimates that control for residual autocorrelation.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 give the Prais-Winsten and GLS estimates The esti-
mated coeﬃcients on the composite institutions index and other controls have remained
36Unfortunately, in this case, a Hausman speciﬁcation test is not particularly helpful. Many time-
invariant factors are signiﬁcant and one cannot distinguish whether the observed ﬁxed-eﬀects correlation
with the error term of the within estimator is due to factors omitted in the within estimation (distance,
ethnolinguistic ties, etc.), but included in the random-eﬀects or other truly unobserved factors. For more
details see Baltagi (1995) and Green (2002) and the discussion in Glick and Rose (2002).
37Following Wei (2000), I have also estimated the basic model adding only "source" or "recipient"
country ﬁxed eﬀects. The "quasi-ﬁxed" eﬀect results are similar and for brevity are not reported.
38A similar problem is typical in investment regressions (see Henry, 1999).
19unchanged implying that autocorrelation is not an important drawback of previous re-
sults. Although autocorrelated disturbances are not present if we pool all data together,
persistence might occur in speciﬁc country-pairs. Feasible GLS estimates that control for
panel-speciﬁc autocorrelation (and heteroskedasticity) are given in the last column (4).
The estimated coeﬃcients are similar to OLS. When high income and regional constants
are included, the estimated coeﬃcient on institutions drops, but is still statistically signif-
icant and economically sizable. A one percent increase in institutional performance leads
to an almost one and a half (γ =1 .34) increase in gross bank ﬂows.
6 Further Evidence
The previous section presented compelling evidence that countries with well-functioning
institutions attract more foreign bank capital. In this section I investigate which insti-
tutions are of foremost importance.39 Then I separate between developed (OECD) and
non-developed nations to investigate whether the documented strong institutional signif-
icance appears solely from the large variation in institutional and economic performance
across rich and poor nations. Finally the results reveal that the same underlying fac-
tors inﬂuence bank ﬂows both in assets and in liabilities, conﬁrming previous models and
empirical studies on their complementarity.40
6.1 Speciﬁc Institutional Characteristics
Table 5, Panel A gives OLS estimates where the composite institutions index has been
replaced with speciﬁc institutional measures. Although these more direct institutional
measures do not exhibit time variability, institutional persistence suggests that we do not
lose much from the use of only one observation per country. To control for macroeco-
nomic developments in the recipient country the speciﬁcation also includes (the log of) a
comprehensive index of economic progress: the "Economic Risk" indicator compiled by
39These speciﬁc institutional indicators are purely cross-sectional. One could argue, therefore, that
estimation and inference in a panel context is problematic. A solution is to estimate cross-section re-
gressions on mean values. Results based on the "between estimator" imply an even higher impact of
institutional performance on international banking activities. These results are available upon request.
40For brevity I report only OLS estimates. The results do not change when alternative panel data
techniques are employed (as in Section 5). Those results are available upon request.
20ICRG.41 As expected economic conditions are positively related to capital ﬂows.42
6.1.1 Corruption
Theory has stressed the malignant role of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, Wei,
2001) in attracting foreign capital. Wei (1999) argues that due to its arbitrariness and
secrecy corruption is more distortionary than taxation for foreign investors.43 The results
presented in the subsequent sections validate this assertion by showing a very strong
negative eﬀect of corruption to international banking activities. In the ﬁrst column of
Table 5, I add a corruption measure in 2000.44 In line with previous theoretical work
and basic intuition (see Prasad et al, 2003 for a review), higher levels of corruption
are associated with lower levels of bank lending. The point estimate implies that if
Peru, which scores a poor 4.7 score (in a 0 − 10 scale), manages to tackle corruption
and reach the level of Costa Rica (8.3), then bank ﬂows will permanently increase by
almost 1% [(8.33 − 4.70) ∗ 0.265 = 0.962] at a quarterly basis. Moreover, the coeﬃcients
on the other gravity controls remain unaﬀected and retain their statistical and economic
signiﬁcance. For example, the coeﬃcient on log distance is still approximately −0.7, while
ethnolinguistic ties and size measures (population, GDP) enter positively and signiﬁcantly.
This result, partially at least, contradicts the cross-sectional evidence provided by Wei
a n dW u( 2 0 0 1 ) ,w h od o c u m e n te i t h e ra ni n s i g n i ﬁcant or a positive eﬀect of corruption on
international bank lending activities. This is most likely due to diﬀerences in the sample
and the employed methodology. Moreover the analysis of Wei and Wu (2001) concentrates
on the diﬀerent impact of corruption on the various types of capital ﬂows rather than on
estimating the exact eﬀect on bank lending. However, the documented in Table 5 negative
impact of corruption on bilateral lending is in line with their simple model with regard
to the determinants of capital ﬂo w si ng e n e r a la n dw i t ht h e i re s t i m a t e dr e s u l t so nF D I
ﬂows.45
41This is a weighted sum of the following macroeconomic factors: GDP growth, inﬂation, ﬁscal balance,
current account and GDP per capita. For more details see Appendix B.
42Note, however, that when speciﬁc macro variables are used, the eﬀect is either insigniﬁcant (GDP or
investment growth) or very small (inﬂation). This contradiction, which is in line with previous evidence
(e.g. Frankel and Roubini, 2001) is most likely due to diﬀerent factor eﬀects across countries and data
pooling.
43Shleifer and Vishny (1994) conclude "....To invest in a Russian company, a foreigner must bribe every
agency involved in foreign investment... The obvious result is that foreigners do not invest in Russia."
44Lower levels of corruption correspond to higher values of this index.
45Their analysis focuses on the relationship of corruption with the type of international ﬂow. For
216.1.2 Legal System & Bureaucratic Quality
In columns (2), (3), (4), and (5) I directly check Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) theo-
retical predictions. A poorly-performing legal environment should cause lower levels of
international lending due to higher agency costs. The shareholder’s protection indicator,
compiled by La Porta et al. (1998), proxies for the de jure, while trial duration for the
de facto eﬃcacy of the legal system.46 B o t hv a r i a b l e sh a v es i g n i ﬁcant coeﬃcients sug-
gesting that an eﬃcient legal environment is necessary to attract foreign capital. This
result holds even after controlling for economic performance and corruption in the re-
cipient country (column 4), suggesting that macroeconomic performance, corruption and
legal eﬃciency play an important and distinguishab l er o l ei np u l l i n gf o r e i g nc a p i t a l .A l -
though anti-director’s rights appear insigniﬁcant in a couple of speciﬁcations, most likely
due to small variability and multicollinearity with the other controls, the variables that
measure the actual eﬃciency (the de facto legal system performance) of the legal envi-
ronment (contract enforceability and trial duration) are always signiﬁcant. This clearly
suggests that modifying and upgrading anachronistic laws is a necessary yet not suﬃcient
condition to attract foreign (bank) capital. What is of foremost importance is actual law
enforcement. The results are similar when I use the (log of the) time it takes to start-up
a new business, which proxies for the quality of bureaucracy and other micro distortions
(like direct and indirect barriers to entry, etc.). The results in column (5) imply that
bureaucratic eﬃciency, corruption, and legal eﬃciency are jointly important in attracting
foreign bank capital.
6.1.3 Government Ownership of Banks
In Table 5, Panel B, I assess and quantify the eﬀect of government control of the banking
sector in the recipient country (j). The indicator of state ownership of banks is taken form
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silaens and Shleifer (2002), who document that government ownership
of banks is associated with lower levels of ﬁnancial development and slower investment
and GDP growth. Sapienza (2003) shows that state owned banks charge lower interest
example, Wei and Wu (2001) document that countries with high levels of corruption receive a higher
portion of bank lending relative to FDI. Moreover and in spite of the statistical insigniﬁcance of the
corruption coeﬃcient, Wei and Wu too acknowledge that it is peculiar that foreign banks seem to invest
more in corrupt countries.
46See Djankov et al. (2003) who show that these measures are indeed good proxies for the legal system
quality in general.
22rates than privately-run banks and that political factors heavily inﬂuence their lending
practices. However government ownership of banks can increase cross border bank lending
activities and enhance the liquidity of the banking sector, since the government implicitly
or explicitly can guarantee that its bank will not default. If this "development"p r e d i c t i o n
holds, then one would expect, other things being equal, higher international lending to
state-owned banks.47
The results presented in panel B of Table 5 reject the "development" conjecture and
support "public-choice" theories of state-ownership that stress the ineﬃciencies generated
by government active involvement in the market. The empirical evidence not only go
in line with the ﬁndings of La Porta et al. (2002) and Sapienza, but also advance the
"public-choice" result of these studies: Foreign banks realize that state-controlled ﬁnancial
institutions promote political rather than proﬁt maximizing objectives and consequently
government ownership of banks appears to heavily impede international banking lending.
Controlling for corruption and legal system quality, increasing the government’s share in
the banking system by one percent decreases the level of cross-border bank lending by an
almost similar magnitude. (0.84 percent).
In columns (3) to (5) the dependent variable is not aggregate ﬂows from banks in
the "source" (i) to all sectors in j,b u tﬂows only to the banking sector in the recipient
country (j). Undoubtedly, one would expect the health and structure of the banking
system in the recipient country (j) to be a crucial factor driving inter-bank international
capital ﬂows. Indeed, the negative impact of state ownership is much higher in inter-bank
(international) activities. In the last columns I use the La Porta et al (2002) measures
of bank soundness and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine’s estimate of bank’s overhead
costs to investigate the direct eﬀect of those performance indicators on cross-border bank
lending. The results imply that international banking institutions are unwilling to invest
or lend to ineﬃcient and vulnerable banks (see also Figures 8 and 9, which plot the log of
inter-bank ﬂows against government control of banking system and the bank soundness
indicator respectively).
These results oﬀer an intuitive explanation of ﬁnancial intermediaries’ illiquidity in
47See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silaens and Shleifer (2002) distinction between "development" and "public-
choice" theories of state ownership. "Development" theories stress the beneﬁts due to government owner-
ship and control, while the "public-choice" tradition emphasizes the negative consequences of state active
involvement in the credit market.
23relatively poor countries: government control of the banking system discourages foreign
lending and consequently hampers bank liquidity. Numerous studies (see for a review,
Levine, 2003) point out that banking system’s liquidity has a strong causal eﬀect to
growth. My evidence, therefore, suggest that privatization will drive foreign bank capital
and relax banking system’s liquidity constraints, fostering in turn growth and investment
(see also Perotti and Van Oijen, 2001).48
6.2 Developed vs. Developing Countries - EU membership
A major concern regarding most empirical analyses on institutions is whether the esti-
mated eﬀect is driven by the substantial variability between rich and developing (or un-
derdeveloped) countries. The critique states that institutions are strongly correlated with
other, diﬃcult to observe, economic (or ﬁnancial) factors that distinguish industrial from
underdeveloped countries. Therefore I reestimate the basic econometric model (1) only
in OECD and non-OECD countries. Moreover investigating how the econometric model
ﬁts OECD member countries can be quite informative not only to check the robustness
of the institutions-capital ﬂows link, but also to quantify the eﬀect of EU membership on
cross-border lending activities.
Table 6 provides estimates for institutional eﬀect on bilateral bank ﬂows in current
(end 2003) OECD member countries.49 As before, the estimation is not particularly
sensitive to the employed methodology. All gravity variables, (distance, ethnolinguistic
ties, per capita GDP, land area, and population) enter with stable coeﬃcients suggesting
that our basic model still performs well. High interest rates in the "source" country
(i)a n ds o a r i n gi n ﬂa t i o ni nt h e" r e c i p i e n t "c o u n t r y ( j) are both associated with lower
bank ﬂows. The γ coeﬃcient on the aggregate institutions index is highly signiﬁcant and
the most conservative estimate (random eﬀects) implies that a one percent institutional
improvement is followed by an almost two percentage increase in international bank ﬂow
volume. Columns (2) to (5) include two dummies for European Union (EU) membership:
the ﬁrst takes a value of one when one of the two counterparts is an EU member; the
48In Appendix C, I provide additional results from reestimating the previous regressions by adding the
composite institutions index. Although the ICRG "political risk" index (partially) measures corruption,
bureaucratic eﬃciency, and legal system eﬃciency, these factors are just a small part of this much broader
index. Multicollinearity is clearly a problem, but this should bias coeﬃcients downwards. Corruption is
still negatively related with bank ﬂo w sa si sl e g a le ﬃciency and government ownership of banks.
49The results are almost identical if we use the pre-1995 OECD member countries or the G-7 or G-10
countries.
24second equals one when both countries are EU members.50 T h eE US i n g l eM a r k e ta n dt h e
subsequent Financial Service Action Plan (started in 1999) aimed to remove (direct and
indirect) barriers in cross-border movements of capital by harmonizing banking law and
ﬁnancial services’ regulations and codes. Moreover, the single currency has minimized
exchange rate risk. The results conﬁrm that EU membership has led to an expansion of
banking activities across member countries. The eﬀect of joint EU membership is quite
large. Joint EU membership almost doubles bank ﬂows (exp(0.64) − 1=0 .89) according
to feasible GLS estimation that controls for panel-speciﬁc residual autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity.51 In contrast, bilateral lending between an EU and a non-EU member
country is estimated to be much smaller leading to an approximately 15% increase in bank
lending activities (exp(0.148) − 1=0 .15), w h i c hi nm a n ys p e c i ﬁcations insigniﬁcant.
T a b l e7s t r e n g t h e n st h er e s u l t so nt h el a r g ei m p a c to fj o i n tE Um e m b e r s h i po nb i -
lateral bank lending. According to the most conservative estimate (column 1) joint EU
membership leads to an almost 50% (exp(0.374) − 1=0 .453) increase in bank ﬂows.
But the eﬀect of corruption, bureaucratic and legal quality is still signiﬁcant, even in
the wealthy OECD sub-sample.52 Anti-director’s rights, contract enforceability and trial
duration always have signiﬁcant and well-behaved coeﬃcients. The same holds for cor-
ruption and government involvement in the banking sector. The results given in column 5
that jointly check for the eﬀect of those factors on international banking activities imply
that a one percent improvement in legal eﬃciency, proxied by trial duration, is associated
by 0.16% increase in bank ﬂows; a ten per cent decline in government ownership of banks
is associated with a remarkably high 6.7% increase.53
50Rose (2003a) uses a similar dummy speciﬁcation in a gravity model to assess the impact of interna-
tional institutions on bilateral trade ﬂows.
51Inserting EU member dummies in the full sample (and not just in the OECD subsample as in Tables
6 and 7) yields larger and even more signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. One needs to account for the large economic
diﬀerences. Therefore I report the most conservative estimates, since I want to avoid EU membership
capturing an OECD or rich countries eﬀect.
52Interestingly all employed institutional indicators exhibit substantial variability even within the
OECD (and G-7 or G-10) sub-sample.
53Even when the speciﬁc institutional measures enter the RHS together with the composite institutional
index (results given in Appendix C), all coeﬃcients retain their economic magnitude and their statistical
signiﬁcance, conﬁrming the strong impact of these institutional arrangements on international bank ﬂows.
256.3 Liability Flows
In Table 8 the basic speciﬁcation is re-estimated, but now the dependent variable is the
logarithm of liability ﬂows from i to j. Interestingly the model performs quite good
for bank ﬂows in liabilities as well. This result might seem puzzling, since international
borrowing is less risky than investing and low-quality institutions in the recipient country
shouldn’t be an important factor for the borrower.
The results given in Table 8 imply that institutions, and all other gravity factors, are
important drivers not only of investment, but also of borrowing ﬂows. Foreign liabilities
of country i, held by residents in j, can serve as collateral for country j and therefore
increase bilateral lending by reducing the riskiness of foreign investment. In addition due
to the hub structure of the international banking system, ﬁnancially developed countries
(mainly Germany, the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom) are at the same
time both lenders and borrowers. This ﬁnding extends previous results of Moshirian and
Van der Laan (1998) and Buch (2000) on the behavior of US, UK and German banks.
It is also consistent with the model and empirical results of Ruﬃn and Rassek (1986),
who document that large US multinational corporations have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
US net capital account position, since their foreign investment and ﬁnancing decisions
go in hand and are not independent. The results shown in Table 8 suggest that capital
inﬂows and outﬂows are mutually dependent and are strong complements; Institutional
performance can therefore explain both international lending and borrowing.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
T h ep r e v i o u se v i d e n c eh a sr e v e a l e das t r o n gi n s t i t u t i o n s - b a n kﬂows link. Institutions
broadly deﬁned, legal eﬃciency, corruption, government ownership of banks and EU mem-
b e r s h i pi np a r t i c u l a rc r u c i a l l yi n ﬂuence the investment decision of foreign banks. In this
section I provide some sensitivity checks, by adding more controls and addressing some
limitations of the BIS data.
267.1 Additional Controls
7.1.1 Economic and Financial Risk
The correllogram given in table 2 entails a large correlation between the "political risk"
measure and the two other "risk" factors, compiled by PRS: the ICRG "economic"a n d
"ﬁnancial risk" indicators.54 One could therefore suspect that the previously estimated
coeﬃcients (using the ICRG index) actually capture "economic"o r" ﬁnancial"r i s kr a t h e r
than institutional role. Although in the previous section (Table 5 & Table 7-Panel B)
legal eﬃciency, corruption, and government ownership of banks all appeared to have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on cross-border bank ﬂows even after controlling for "economic risk", in
this subsection I check which type of risk is most important for foreign banks when making
their international capital allocation decisions. For example, Erb, Harvey and Viskanta
(1996a, 1996b) ﬁnd that the "economic risk" index carries the bulk of information, while
"political risk" is the least informative in predicting future equity and bond returns.
The results presented in Panel A of Table 9 reveal a diﬀerent picture than on the
Erb, Harvey and Viskanta studies. Political risk, i.e. institutions, is the most important
factor for foreign banks when making their international capital allocation decisions. The
ﬁrst three columns in Table 9 give the estimated coeﬃcients for the basic gravity model,
augmented with each of the three risk indicators. As expected, all three risk characteristics
are key drivers of foreign (bank) capital. The coeﬃcient for "political risk"i sh o w e v e r
the largest; additionally the speciﬁcation with this composite institutions index has the
best explanatory power (in terms of R2). In column (4), I jointly estimate the eﬀect
of "economic"a n d" political risk" while in column (5) I include all three factors. The
results should be interpreted cautiously, due to high multicollinearity. However, in all
speciﬁcations, the institutional risk factor has the coeﬃcient with the largest economic
magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance, conﬁrming that institutional arrangements are the
most important factor for international bank ﬂows.
7.1.2 Human Capital
One of the main reasons that capital doesn’t ﬂows to poor countries is undoubtedly the
low level of human capital that reduce the rate of capital returns. Lucas (1990) argued
54In my sample, the correlation between "political risk"a n d" economic risk" is 0.685 and with "ﬁnancial
risk" is 0.737.
27that human capital diﬀerences can explain a big part of the low capital ﬂows puzzle,
y e ti sb yn om e a n st h es o l ea n s w e r . A l f a r oe ta l . ( 2 0 0 3 )p r e s e n te v i d e n c et h a th u m a n
capital diﬀerences can empirically explain a substantial part of the puzzle, although their
cross-country regressions reveal that low-quality institutions is a much more serious im-
pediment. Since human capital is highly correlated both with wealth and well-functioning
institutions, the previous estimates might be capturing part of the eﬀect of education. In
panel B of Table 9, I add secondary schooling to control for human capital and experi-
m e n tw i t ho t h e rp r o x i e sf o rl e g a le ﬃciency and government ownership of banks.55 In all
speciﬁcations the coeﬃcient for schooling is positive and signiﬁcant. Consistent with a
neoclassical production function and Lucas’ (1990) point, more educated societies, other
things equal, engage more in international banking activities and have consequently more
l i q u i d( a n de ﬃcient) ﬁnancial intermediaries. However, neither the eﬀect of the aggre-
gate institutions index nor that of all other speciﬁc institutional measures (corruption,
anti-director’s rights, government stake at the banking sector, legal eﬃcacy) has lost its
signiﬁcance, suggesting that wealth (proxied by the log of GDP), human capital (prox-
ied by schooling) and institutions (captured by the ICRG "political risk" indicator) all
contribute to the explanation on why capital doesn’t ﬂow to capital-scarce countries.
7.2 Data Limitations
The BIS dataset includes many zeros, especially in some developing and non-developed
countries. Since a log transformation has been applied these observations have not been
considered until now. A careful analysis of the BIS data reveals that these zeros indeed
represent non reporting gaps rather than actual zero ﬂows. Yet, I re-estimate the previous
speciﬁcation replacing zeros with a value of one, yielding a log value of zero ﬂows. Table
10 reproduces some of the previous estimates. Naturally, the overall ﬁt of the model
has worsened. The magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance of all estimated coeﬃcients
has however remained unchanged. In fact, the estimated γ coeﬃcient on the composite
institutions index has increased. Corruption is still negatively associated with capital
inﬂows, while the anti-director’s rights index and the log of time to evict a tenant for
non-payment are still signiﬁcant, with well-behaved coeﬃcients.
55Speciﬁcally I use the log of the time to collect a bounced check (instead of time to evict a tenant
for non-payment) and government ownership of commercial banks at the 20 per cent level (instead of
government ownership of all banking institutions at the 50 per cent level). For more details on the sources
and speciﬁcd e ﬁnitions of these variables see Appendix B.
28Table 11 shows some additional robustness checks. It is particularly interesting to
check whether the factors that inﬂuenced international investment decisions have changed
over time. This is interesting since many economies have only recently lifted capital ac-
count restrictions and since the volume of cross-border ﬂows has drastically increased in
the nineties. For columns (1) to (4) I therefore split the sample into two periods, investi-
gating whether the eﬀect of institutions, corruption and legal eﬃciency have changed over
time. The econometric model, in general, and the eﬀect of institutional arrangements, in
particular, is robust, implying that gravity factors and institutions played a crucial role
throughout the eighties and nineties.
In the last four columns of Table 11 I check whether the results are inﬂuenced by the
fundamental role of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, in the global
ﬁnancial system.56 All typical gravity equation regressors enter the speciﬁcation with
well-behaved coeﬃcients. More importantly, the aggregate measure of political institu-
tions in the recipient country (j)a l w a y sh a sas i g n i ﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient, even when
controlling for legal eﬃciency and corruption. Government ownership of banks and cor-
ruption are negatively associated with bank lending, while a well-performing legal system
magnetizes foreign capital.
8C o n c l u s i o n
Few doubt that institutions, to a smaller or greater extent inﬂuence ﬁnancial and economic
development. The challenge for empirical research is to quantify which type and through
which channels institutions inﬂuence economic activity. This paper demonstrates that
an important channel of inﬂuence of institutions both for ﬁnance and growth is that
of attracting foreign capital. Controlling for size, distance and other macroeconomic
developments, the results reveal that countries with high-quality institutions engage more
in asset trade and consequently face less binding ﬁnancing constraints.
This paper quantiﬁe st h er o l eo fb o t hb r o a d l yd e ﬁned institutional arrangements, and
that of speciﬁc institutional characteristics. The results are robust to various method-
ologies and perturbations: Foreign banks tend to prefer investing and allocating credit
56For example, a concern regarding the paper by Portes, Rey and Oh (2001) on the determinants of
equidy ﬂows was the fact that US was the only counterpart. Portes and Rey (2002) address this limitation
by using bilateral equity ﬂows data from fourteen countries and ﬁnd similar results.
29to uncorrupted countries that are also characterized by a well-functioning legal system.
Government ownership of banks ampliﬁes agency costs and is associated with lower levels
of international bank lending. Finally, ﬁnancial securities’ and banking law harmonization
policies that European countries have implemented together with the minimization of ex-
change rate risk, have spurred cross-border bank lending activities within the European
Union.
Enhancing domestic liquidity by attracting foreign capital has recently become a cor-
nerstone of economic policy in many developing countries, who usually lack credit to
ﬁnance domestic investment. My results suggest that structural policies aiming to im-
prove ineﬃcient bureaucracies, tackle corruption, and enhance legal system competence
are crucial to attract foreign bank capital and consequently to spur investment and growth.
This policy-recommendation does not only apply to developing economies. Improving in-
stitutional performance is followed by a substantial increase in lending activities, even
in wealthy countries that have relatively well-performing legal and bureaucratic systems
(OECD).
From a theoretical standpoint the evidence provided conﬁrm the predictions of Shleifer
and Wolfenzon’s (2002) model, who stress the necessity of an eﬃcient legal system for
ﬁnancial development. They also oﬀer a plausible explanation to the Lucas (1990) inquiry
on "why capital doesn’t ﬂy from rich to poor nations" .T h ea n s w e rl i e si np o o rn a t i o n ’ s
relatively poorly performing institutions, corruption, ineﬃcient government policies and
low-quality law! Although it is unlikely that institutions alone can explain the large
equity home-bias and the low levels of international diversiﬁcation, the results imply that
institutional performance should be a necessary ingredient for any serious theoretical and
empirical eﬀort to analyze cross-border capital movements.
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37Figures 1 – 5 
Figures 1 to 5 plot the cross-time mean of the natural logarithm of cross-border bank flows against: 1) the mean value of the log 
of real GDP in recipient country (Figure 1), 2) The mean value of the aggregate institutions index “ICRG political risk” measure 
(Figure 2), 3) A measure of corruption (higher value indicates lower level of corruption) in the recipient country (Figure 3), 4) A 
measure of contract enforceability in the recipient country (Figure 4), and 5) the time it is required to start-up a new business, 
which proxies for bureaucratic quality (Figure 5). For detailed variable definitions and sources, check Appendix B. For country 
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Figures 6 plots the volume of international bank lending activities (in millions of US Dollars) from the United States to 
Philippines and the evolution of political institutions in Philippines (0-100 ICRG “political risk” indicator”). ). For detailed 
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The solid line represents a linear prediction of the log of gross cross-border bank flows (in assets) from the United States to 
Philippines based on the specification given in Table 1 (column 5). The doted line is the simulated evolution of gross cross-
border bank flows (in assets) if Philippines throughout the sample period (1984-2002) had the level of political institutions in 
1984 (a score of 38 in the 0-100 ICRG “political risk” index). The dashed line gives the actual log value of gross cross-border 
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An Example: United States Lending to Philippines
Actual vs. Predicted Bank Flows & InstitutionsFigures 8 & 9 
 
Figures 8 and 9 plot the cross-time mean of the natural logarithm of cross-border inter-bank (bank to bank) flows against: 1) 
government ownership of banking institutions in the recipient country in 1995 (Figure 1), 2) An indicator of bank soundness in 
recipient country in 1999  (Figure 2). For detailed variable definitions and sources, check Appendix B. For country abbreviations 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Distance -0.794 -0.627 -0.648 -0.624
-13.27 -11.63 -11.46 -9.9
Common Border -0.066 -0.065 -0.041 -0.027
-0.41 -0.43 -0.26 -0.17
Ethnolinguistic Ties 0.585 0.578 0.585 0.616
4.42 5.05 5.12 5.43
Log Product Land Area -0.186 -0.208 -0.194 -0.203
-6.74 -8.73 -8 -8.32
Log Product Real p.c. GDP 0.388 0.258 0.840 0.847
11.9 9.31 28.36 28.2
Log Product Population 0.789 0.844 0.249 0.249
24.14 28.96 8.88 9.1
Log Composite Institutions 3.431 3.516 3.339
15.63 15.6 14.62




Adjusted R squared 0.452 0.501 0.505 0.507
Observations 38688 38086 35546 35546
Regional & Income Dummies  No No No Yes
Panel B
Tobit "Between" "Within" "Random Effects"
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Distance -0.731 -0.677 -0.760
-61.22 -12.41 -16.48
Common Border -0.248 -0.137 0.396
-6.43 -0.71 2.14
Ethnolinguistic Ties 0.455 0.582 0.933
18.45 4.79 8.12
Log Product Land Area -0.165 -0.139 -0.088
-31.47 -5.29 -3.91
Log Product Real p.c. GDP 0.842 0.761 -0.853 0.779
136.23 23.66 -5.76 29.85
Log Product Population 0.168 0.222 0.024 0.113
34.17 8.38 2.85 15.11
Log Composite Institutions 2.333 3.781 0.220 0.598
37.9 11.25 2.67 7.73
Lending Rate-Source Country -0.077 -0.090 0.024 0.006
-22.82 -4.05 5.48 1.48
Adjusted R squared 0.29 0.764 0.115 0.399
Observations 35546 35546 35546 35546
Regional & Income Dummies  Yes No No No
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" country). Estimation 
in Panel A is performed by OLS. Panel B gives Tobit, "Between", "Within", and "Random Effects" panel estimates. Time period (year, quarter) 
fixed effect dummies and a constant term are included, but their coefficients are not reported. T-statistics based on robust standard errors 
(adjusted for clustering by country pairs) are given in italics. Definitions and sources for all variables are given in Appendix B.
OLSTable 4
Benchmark Estimates - Dynamic Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prais-Winsten GLS Random Effects Feasible GLS 
Log Distance -0.692 -0.704 -0.797 -0.650
-14.00 -45.35 -18.92 -47.51
Ethnolinguistic Ties 0.376 0.355 0.740 0.270
3.07 8.90 6.20 8.02
Log Product Land Area -0.155 -0.168 -0.111 -0.138
-5.63 -20.10 -4.70 -18.79
Log Product Real p.c. GDP 0.249 0.272 0.144 0.146
8.70 37.60 14.22 24.82
Log Product Population 0.769 0.776 0.744 0.738
24.77 78.91 27.04 88.96
Log Composite Institutions 3.184 3.072 0.776 1.358
15.12 38.53 7.62 17.26
Lending Rate-Source Country -0.081 -0.074 -0.001 -0.081
-6.37 -14.59 -0.18 -19.75
Inflation-Recipient Country 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-1.26 -1.88 -2.70 -1.80
Wald chi square 3076.49 15930.21 3056.73 49289.36
Observations 26765 26760 26765 26760
Number of Panels (country-pairs) 682 687 687 687
Regional & Income Dummies  No No Yes
Residual Autocorrelation Coefficient 0.534 0.22 panel specific
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" country). Column 
1 reports the Prais-Winsten estimators that control for first order residual autocorrelation. Column 2 gives estimated GLS coefficients adjusted 
for first-order serial correlation. Column 3 reports coefficients estimated by "random effects" estimation adjusted for first-order autocorrelation 
in the error term. Column 4  reports Feasible GLS estimates that control for panel-specific (country-pairs) autocorrelation and contemporaneous 
cross-panel residual correlation. Time period (year, quarter) fixed effect dummies and a constant term are included, but their coefficients are not 
reported. T-statistics based on robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by country pairs) are given in italics. Definitions and sources for all 
variables are given in Appendix B.Table 5
Specific Institutional Arrangements (I)
   
Panel A: Corruption, Legal System & Bureaucractic Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Distance -0.678 -0.784 -0.824 -0.807 -0.836
-11.33 -13.10 -12.18 -13.54 -12.40
Common Border -0.038 -0.273 -0.288 -0.250 -0.243
-0.24 -1.74 -1.71 -1.55 -1.45
Ethnolinguistic Ties 0.372 0.390 0.282 0.322 0.230
3.21 3.34 2.46 2.83 2.04
Log Product Land Area -0.198 -0.206 -0.189 -0.225 -0.202
-7.81 -7.77 -7.01 -8.65 -7.52
Log Product Real p.c. GDP 0.151 0.139 0.124 0.155 0.120
6.34 6.69 6.24 7.68 6.17
Log Product Population 0.909 0.911 0.891 0.911 0.907
29.22 28.41 27.46 28.28 28.24
Lending Rate-Source Country -0.075 -0.083 -0.088 -0.082 -0.088
-5.54 -5.98 -6.43 -6.10 -6.47
Log of Economic Risk in Recipient  1.512 0.919 0.801 1.024 0.902
6.05 3.24 2.80 3.65 3.13
Corruption 0.265 0.316 0.147 0.273 0.165
7.40 10.75 3.28 8.50 3.74
Antidirector's Rights 0.083 0.075 0.063 0.027
2.32 2.21 1.80 0.70
Contract Enforceability 0.248 0.137
4.97 2.38
Log of evict time -0.274
-4.04
Log of start-up business time -0.192
-3.06
Adjusted R squared 0.5267 0.5411 0.5436 0.5471 0.5482
Observations 34188 31947 30674 31947 30674
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows  from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" country). 
Estimation is performed by OLS. Time period (year, quarter) fixed effect dummies and a constant are included, but their coefficients are not 
reported. T-statistics based on robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by country pairs) are reported in italics. Definitions for all 
variables are given in Appendix B.Table 5 (cont).
Specific Institutional Arrangements (II)
Panel B: Government Ownership of Banks
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Flows to Banking Sector Only
Log Distance -0.828 -0.830 -0.888 -0.794 -0.859
-13.66 -12.33 -14.31 -11.60 -13.43
Common Border -0.079 -0.247 -0.167 -0.111 0.019
-0.47 0.00 -0.93 -0.56 0.10
Ethnolinguistic Ties 0.218 0.227 0.259 0.050 0.157
1.57 1.96 1.84 0.38 1.10
Log Product Land Area -0.109 -0.178 -0.125 -0.159 -0.161
-3.84 -6.81 -4.14 -5.28 -4.87
Log Product Real p.c. GDP 0.261 0.122 0.280 0.126 0.274
8.60 6.32 8.80 6.14 7.69
Log Product Population 0.680 0.853 0.693 0.794 0.744
20.55 24.93 19.58 20.67 19.14
Lending Rate - Source Country -0.098 -0.092 -0.082 -0.091 -0.074
-6.75 -6.91 -5.39 -6.57 -4.69
Log of Economic Risk in Recipient  2.524 0.568 2.947 0.814
10.38 2.06 10.97 2.76
Governmnet Ownership of Banks -1.446 -0.844 -1.482 -0.924 -1.384
-7.88 -4.05 -7.89 -4.51 -6.53
Corruption 0.115 0.092
2.47 6.57
Antidirector's Rights 0.026 -0.003
0.73 -0.09
Contract Enforceability 0.257 0.381
4.32 1.85
Soundness of Banks (1999) 0.230
5.29
Bank Overhead Costs (1995) -9.836
-3.96
Adjusted R squared 0.4995 0.5488 0.5015 0.5513 0.4966
Observations 26592 26592 25545 23355 25383
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows  from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" country). 
Estimation is performed by OLS. Time period (year, quarter) fixed effect dummies and a constant are included, but their coefficients are not 
reported. T-statistics based on robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by country pairs) are reported in italics. Definitions for all 
variables are given in Appendix B.
Aggregate Asset FlowsTable 6
Political Institutions in OECD countries - Various Methodologies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS Random Effects Between Effects FGLS
Log Distance -0.691 -0.572 -0.56 -0.776 -0.615
-9.75 -8.33 -10.86 -10.51 -32.85
Common Border -0.160 -0.126 0.009 -0.413 -0.263
-0.91 -0.75 0.05 -2.33 -5.70
Ethnolinguistic Ties 0.330 0.534 0.96 0.437 0.635
2.28 3.81 8.19 3.40 17.54
Log Product Land Area -0.183 -0.174 -0.153 -0.187 -0.166
-5.92 -5.71 -6.30 -5.44 -19.82
Log Product Real p.c. GDP 0.372 0.381 0.07 0.510 0.313
9.4 10.16 6.85 7.82 30.03
Log Product Population 0.789 0.792 0.815 0.786 0.795
23.67 21.81 29.54 19.18 76.77
Lending Rate-Source Country -0.077 -0.078 0.01 -0.073 -0.063
-5.16 -5.40 0.48 -2.56 -12.64
Inflation-Recipient Country -0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.010 -0.004
-2.73 -0.33 -0.03 1.38 -3.97
Log Composite Institutions 3.917 3.909 1.98 3.155 3.379
10.57 10.79 13.94 3.11 22.12
One country EU member 0.324 -0.145 0.355 0.148
2.42 -1.12 2.26 3.85
Both countries EU members 0.916 0.20 0.718 0.640
5.51 3.10 3.17 12.94
Adjusted R squared
   within 0.1468
   between 0.5292 0.84
   overall 0.48 0.509 0.4214
Observations 25709 25709 25709 25709 25709
Number of Panels 487 487 487 487
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" country). Columns 1 and 
2 give OLS estimates; column 3 random-effcets estimates; column 4 "between effects" estimation results and column 5 Feasible GLS estimates that 
correct for panel-specific heroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Time period (year, quarter) fixed effect dummies and a constant term are included, but 
their coefficients are not reported.are included. T-statistics based on robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by country pairs heteroskedasticity) 
are given in italics.  Estimation is performed only on current (2003) OECD member countries. Definitions and sources for all variables are given in 
Appendix B.Table 7
Specific Institutional Arrangements in OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Distance -0.677 -0.908 -0.511 -0.727 -0.616
-8.18 -13.91 -7.94 -9.90 -9.03
Common Border -0.143 -0.273 -0.094 -0.128 -0.095
-0.79 -1.70 -0.55 -0.77 -0.56
Ethnolinguistic Ties 0.317 0.325 0.504 0.379 0.381
2.60 2.76 3.65 2.60 2.72
Log Product Land Area -0.236 -0.192 -0.229 -0.146 -0.229
-7.73 -6.55 -7.65 -4.71 -7.32
Log Product Real p.c. GDP 0.205 0.244 0.295 0.364 0.269
6.09 9.50 8.02 9.69 7.66
Log Product Population 0.853 0.799 0.877 0.734 0.873
23.76 21.96 23.39 19.86 22.97
Lending Rate-Source Country -0.089 -0.095 -0.070 -0.087 -0.075
-6.50 -7.04 -4.93 -5.74 -5.42
Log of Economic Risk  0.458 2.238 0.502 2.395 0.811
1.15 8.60 1.32 7.05 2.02
One country EU member 0.083 0.200 0.134 0.240 0.068
0.64 1.67 1.04 1.71 0.54
Both countries EU members 0.374 0.403 0.612 0.573 0.391
2.17 2.42 3.76 3.16 2.37
Antidirector's Rights 0.182
5.38
Contract Enforceability 0.333 0.144
8.70 4.01




Governmnet Ownership of Banks -1.494 -0.667
-6.78 -2.42
Adjusted R squared 0.523 0.515 0.512 0.498 0.520
Observations 23033 25317 25317 25317 25317
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows  from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" country). Estimation is 
performed by OLS. Time period (year, quarter) fixed effect dummies and a constant are included, but their coefficients are not reported. T-statistics 
based on robust standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity clustering by country pairs) are reported in italics. Estimation is performed only on 
current (2003) OECD member countries. Definitions and sources for all variables are given in Appendix B.Table 8
Liability Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Distance -0.871 -0.975 -0.793 -0.841 -0.796
-10.64 -14.02 -11.35 -11.82 -11.98
Common Border -0.420 -0.338 -0.182 -0.260 -0.194
-2.13 -1.88 -1.03 -1.43 -1.11
Ethnolinguistic Ties 0.292 0.226 0.257 0.204 0.251
1.74 1.47 1.85 1.43 1.77
Log Product Land Area -0.163 -0.180 -0.183 -0.187 -0.191
-4.22 -5.31 -5.89 -5.88 -6.26
Log Product Real p.c. GDP 0.307 0.234 0.135 0.129 0.154
6.37 6.33 3.82 3.74 4.51
Log Product Population 0.821 0.723 0.809 0.806 0.801
21.92 18.66 21.18 20.46 20.82
Lending Rate-Source Country -0.065 -0.084 -0.083 -0.086 -0.080
-3.88 -5.3 -5.46 -5.56 -5.35
Log Composite Institutions 4.791
9.01
Log of Economic Risk in Recipient  2.755 1.571 1.309 1.596
7.96 5.15 3.71 4.79
Antidirector's Rights 0.080 -0.015
1.69 -0.33
Log of evict time -0.383 -0.178 -0.290
-5.47 -2.29 -3.48
Corruption 0.244 0.250 0.253
5.81 5.86 6.73
Log of start-up business time -0.170 -0.094
-3.1 -1.52
Governmnet Ownership of Banks -0.016
-0.07
Adjusted R squared 26754 24611 26057 24611 26093
Observations 0.4499 0.4689 0.4701 0.4963 0.4880
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross liability flows from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" country). Estimation 
is performed by OLS. Time period (year, quarter) fixed effect dummies and a constant are included, but their coefficients are not reported. T-statistics 
based on robust standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity clustering by country pairs) are reported in italics. Definitions and sources for all 
variables are given in Appendix B.Table 9
Additional Controls 
Panel A: Political, Economic and Financial Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Distance -0.750 -0.717 -0.627 -0.635 -0.639
-13.13 -12.39 -11.63 -11.72 -11.78
Log Product Land Area -0.163 -0.178 -0.208 -0.195 -0.197
-6.34 -7.00 -8.73 -8.15 -8.23
Log Product Real p.c. GDP 0.806 0.786 0.844 0.844 0.849
25.79 25.84 28.96 28.92 29.28
Log Product Population 0.283 0.315 0.258 0.240 0.239
9.16 10.28 9.31 8.67 8.64
Log Economic Risk in Recipient Country 3.171 1.227 1.502
14.54 5.10 5.82




Adjusted R squared 0.4796 0.4738 0.5006 0.51 0.5042
Observations 38086 38086 38086 38086 38086
Panel B: Human Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Distance -0.742 -0.733 -0.844 -0.803 -0.849
-12.4 -11.17 -12.42 -14.12 -12.65
Log Product Land Area -0.163 -0.159 -0.164 -0.148 -0.155
-6.12 -5.38 -5.74 -5.53 -5.38
Log Product Real p.c. GDP 0.207 0.167 0.121 0.195 0.124
7.72 6.88 6.31 7.8 6.55
Log Product Population 0.782 0.827 0.860 0.747 0.838
24.83 24.15 26.51 23.22 24.79
Lending Rate-Source Country -0.092 -0.092 -0.099 -0.099 -0.101
-7.02 -6.75 -7.14 -7.62 -7.43
Schooling in Recipient Country 0.156 0.116 0.180 0.142 0.169
7.44 4.19 6.54 6.78 5.84
Log Composite Institutions 2.474 2.023
11.62 8.86
Corruption 0.274 0.231 0.221
7.88 6.47 6.23
Log of time to collect a bounched check -0.108
-1.7
Antidirector's Rights 0.046 0.021
1.2 0.55
Governmnet Ownership of Comm. Banks -1.159 -0.497
-6.4 -2.3
Adjusted R squared 0.529 0.5242 0.5476 0.5367 0.5498
Observations 25971 26030 24984 25971 24984
Log Composite Institutions (Political Risk) 
in Recipient Country
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" country). Estimation is 
performed with OLS. Panel A controls for Financial and Economic Risk, while Panel B for Human capital. Time period (year, quarter) fixed effect 
dummies, a common border dummy, an ethnolinguistic ties dummy and a constant term are included, but their coefficients are not reported. T-statistics 
based on robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by country pairs) are given in italics. Definitions and sources for all variables are given in Appendix 
B.Table 10 - Sensitivity Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Liability Flows Asset Flows Asset Flows Asset Flows Asset Flows
Log Distance -1.898 -1.467 -1.750 -1.396 -1.624
-13.49 -11.02 -13.69 -11.13 -12.57
Common Border -1.798 -0.935 -1.266 -0.653 -1.107
-4.60 -2.42 -3.73 -1.79 -3.17
Ethnolinguistic Ties 1.088 0.885 0.351 0.277 0.194
3.70 2.95 1.20 0.96 0.68
Log Product Land Area -0.430 -0.425 -0.406 -0.487 -0.403
-6.81 -6.89 -6.74 -8.07 -6.89
Log Product Real p.c. GDP 1.640 1.740 1.533 1.757 1.644
21.98 23.51 20.41 21.78 20.47
Log Product Population 0.485 0.487 0.358 0.329 0.247
6.49 7.09 5.71 4.90 3.73
Lending Rate-Source Country -0.169 -0.190 -0.223 -0.204 -0.223
-5.33 -6.02 -7.65 -7.01 -7.81
4.588 5.944 5.319 2.217 3.387
6.92 9.19 8.34 3.63 5.68
Inflation-Recipient Country -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
-2.18 -1.21 -0.83 -0.95 -0.37
Log of evict time -0.330
-2.56




Log of start-up business time -0.554 -0.404
-5.15 -3.68
Adjusted R squared 0.3554 0.3707 0.3906 0.3872 0.3999
Observations 39424 39484 34433 34433 34433
The dependent variable is either the natural logarithm of gross asset flows (Asset Flows) of gross flows in liabilities (Liability Flows) from country i 
("source" country) to country j ("recipient" country). Time period (year, quarter) fixed effect dummies and a constant term are included, but their coeffients 
are not reported. Estimation is performed by OLS. T-statistics based on robust standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity clustering by country pairs) 
are reported in italics. Definitions and sources for all variables are given in Appendix B. Zeros of the original BIS dataset are included.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4Appendix A -- Sample Countries 
 
 
Source Countries/Reporting Area (19 countries):  
Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Ireland 
(IRL), Italy (ITA), Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Portugal (start 1997 q4) (PRT), Spain (ESP), 
Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), United Kingdom (GBR), United States (USA), Japan (JPN), Canada 
(CAN), Australia (start 1997 q4) (AUS).    
  
Recipient/Vis-à-vis countries (51 Countries): 
Argentina (ARG), Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Bulgaria (BGR), Brazil (BRA), 
Botswana (BWA), Canada (CAN), Switzerland (CHE), Chile (CHL), China (CHN), Colombia (COL), 
Costa Rica (CRI), Czech Republic (CZE), Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK), Ecuador (ECU), Spain 
(ESP), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), United Kingdom (GBR), Croatia (HRV), Hungary 
(HUN), Indonesia (IDN), Ireland (IRL), Israel  (ISR), Italy (ITA), Jordan (JOR), Japan (JPN), Korea, 
Republic of (KOR), Lithuania (LTU), Latvia (LVA), Mexico (MEX), Malaysia (MYS), Namibia (NAM), 
Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), New Zealand (NZL), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), Poland (POL), 
Portugal (PRT), Romania (ROM), Slovak Republic (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), Sweden (SWE), Tunisia 
(TUN), Turkey (TUR), United States (USA), South Africa (ZAF).  
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P
r
o
f
i
l
e
 
 
 
 
C
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
 
V
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
/
E
x
p
r
o
p
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
 
P
r
o
f
i
t
s
 
R
e
p
a
t
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
 
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
 
D
e
l
a
y
s
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
C
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
 
 
 
 
C
i
v
i
l
 
W
a
r
 
 
 
 
T
e
r
r
o
r
i
s
m
/
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
V
i
o
l
e
n
c
e
 
 
 
 
C
i
v
i
l
 
D
i
s
o
r
d
e
r
 
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
C
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
 
 
 
 
W
a
r
 
 
 
 
C
r
o
s
s
-
B
o
r
d
e
r
 
C
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
 
 
 
 
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e
s
 
C
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
 
M
i
l
i
t
a
r
y
 
i
n
 
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
s
 
R
e
l
i
g
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
s
 
L
a
w
 
a
n
d
 
O
r
d
e
r
 
E
t
h
n
i
c
 
T
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
 
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
i
c
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
B
u
r
e
a
u
c
r
a
c
y
 
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
 
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
t
 
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
R
i
s
k
 
 
 
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
6
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
6
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
6
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
6
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
6
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
6
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
1
0
0
 
 
 
 
G
D
P
 
p
e
r
 
H
e
a
d
 
o
f
 
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
R
e
a
l
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
G
D
P
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
I
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
 
 
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
a
s
 
a
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
a
s
 
a
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
 
 
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
R
i
s
k
 
 
 
 
5
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
1
0
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
1
0
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
1
0
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
1
5
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
 
5
0
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
 
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
D
e
b
t
 
a
s
 
a
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
 
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
D
e
b
t
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
a
s
 
a
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
E
x
p
o
r
t
s
 
o
f
 
G
o
o
d
s
 
a
n
d
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
a
s
 
a
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
E
x
p
o
r
t
s
 
o
f
 
G
o
o
d
s
 
a
n
d
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
N
e
t
 
L
i
q
u
i
d
i
t
y
 
a
s
 
M
o
n
t
h
s
 
o
f
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
C
o
v
e
r
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
R
a
t
e
 
S
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
 
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
R
i
s
k
 
 
 
1
0
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
1
0
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
1
5
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
5
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
1
0
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
5
0
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
 
s
e
e
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
p
r
s
g
r
o
u
p
.
c
o
m
/
i
c
r
g
/
i
c
r
g
.
h
t
m
l
 
 P
a
n
e
l
 
B
 
–
 
B
I
S
 
D
a
t
a
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
n
a
m
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
 
 
B
a
n
k
 
F
l
o
w
s
 
•
 
A
s
s
e
t
s
 
•
 
L
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
o
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
c
l
a
i
m
s
 
(
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
)
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
 
o
f
f
i
c
e
s
 
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
“
r
e
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
 
a
r
e
a
”
 
t
o
 
v
i
s
 
a
 
v
i
s
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
C
l
a
i
m
s
 
(
a
n
d
 
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
)
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
e
x
p
o
s
u
r
e
 
b
o
t
h
 
v
i
s
-
à
-
v
i
s
 
n
o
n
-
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
s
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
e
x
p
o
s
u
r
e
 
t
o
 
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
.
 
 
P
r
i
m
a
r
i
l
y
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
o
n
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
-
s
h
e
e
t
 
i
t
e
m
s
 
(
p
l
u
s
 
s
o
m
e
 
o
f
f
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
s
h
e
e
t
 
i
t
e
m
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
a
r
e
a
 
o
f
 
t
r
u
s
t
e
e
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
)
;
 
A
s
s
e
t
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
m
a
i
n
l
y
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
 
p
l
a
c
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
b
a
n
k
s
,
 
l
o
a
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
d
v
a
n
c
e
s
 
t
o
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
n
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
h
o
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
o
f
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
L
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
p
r
i
m
a
r
i
l
y
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
a
n
d
 
l
o
a
n
s
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
n
o
n
-
b
a
n
k
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
f
u
n
d
s
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
 
o
n
 
a
 
t
r
u
s
t
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
i
n
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
o
w
n
 
n
a
m
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
b
a
n
k
s
’
 
o
w
n
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
o
f
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
.
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
-
B
a
n
k
 
A
s
s
e
t
 
F
l
o
w
s
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
o
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
c
l
a
i
m
s
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
 
o
f
f
i
c
e
s
 
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
“
r
e
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
 
a
r
e
a
”
 
o
n
l
y
 
t
o
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
t
o
 
v
i
s
 
a
 
v
i
s
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
 
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
B
a
n
k
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
B
I
S
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
 
o
n
l
y
 
s
t
o
c
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
n
o
t
 
f
l
o
w
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
B
I
S
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
f
l
o
w
s
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
o
f
 
s
t
o
c
k
s
,
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
 
(
w
h
i
c
h
 
i
s
 
f
e
a
s
i
b
l
e
,
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
a
l
s
o
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
)
 
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
L
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
B
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
B
a
n
k
 
o
f
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
S
e
t
t
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
;
 
f
a
l
l
 
2
0
0
3
 
(
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
b
o
t
h
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
a
n
d
 
n
o
t
-
y
e
t
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
l
y
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
d
a
t
a
.
 
 
 
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
C
 
–
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
n
a
m
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
 
 
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
 
R
a
t
e
 
B
a
n
k
 
R
a
t
e
/
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
a
t
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
t
h
e
 
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
l
e
n
d
 
o
r
 
d
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
 
e
l
i
g
i
b
l
e
 
p
a
p
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
m
o
n
e
y
 
b
a
n
k
s
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
I
M
F
 
I
F
S
 
l
i
n
e
 
6
0
 
L
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
r
a
t
e
 
L
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
r
a
t
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
n
k
 
r
a
t
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
u
s
u
a
l
l
y
 
m
e
e
t
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
h
o
r
t
 
a
n
d
 
m
e
d
i
u
m
 
t
e
r
m
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
n
g
 
n
e
e
d
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
I
M
F
 
I
F
S
 
l
i
n
e
 
6
0
P
 
I
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
 
C
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
C
P
I
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
I
M
F
 
I
F
S
 
l
i
n
e
 
6
4
 
G
D
P
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
G
D
P
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
I
F
S
 
l
i
n
e
 
9
9
B
.
 
L
o
g
 
r
e
a
l
 
G
D
P
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
L
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
 
v
o
l
u
m
e
,
 
c
o
n
v
e
r
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
U
S
 
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
C
P
I
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
I
M
F
 
I
F
S
 
9
9
B
 
L
o
g
 
A
r
e
a
 
L
o
g
 
o
f
 
l
a
n
d
 
A
r
e
a
 
i
n
 
s
q
u
a
r
e
 
k
i
l
o
m
e
t
e
r
s
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
G
a
l
l
u
p
,
 
M
e
l
l
i
n
g
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
S
a
c
h
s
.
 
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
a
b
l
e
 
a
t
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
c
i
d
.
h
a
r
v
a
r
d
.
e
d
u
/
c
i
d
d
a
t
a
/
c
i
d
d
a
t
a
.
h
t
m
l
 
 
L
o
g
 
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
V
a
l
u
e
s
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
 
t
o
 
m
i
d
-
y
e
a
r
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
.
 
A
 
l
i
n
e
a
r
 
i
n
t
e
r
p
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
u
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
f
i
l
l
 
i
n
 
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
I
M
F
 
I
F
S
 
l
i
n
e
 
9
9
Z
.
 
L
i
n
g
u
i
s
t
i
c
 
T
i
e
 
D
u
m
m
y
 
D
u
m
m
y
 
e
q
u
a
l
s
 
o
n
e
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
w
o
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
a
 
c
o
m
m
o
n
 
l
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
 
o
r
 
h
a
v
e
 
f
o
r
m
e
r
 
c
o
l
o
n
i
a
l
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
A
n
d
r
e
w
 
R
o
s
e
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
,
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
l
y
 
f
r
o
m
 
C
I
A
 
F
a
c
t
b
o
o
k
;
 
 
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
a
b
l
e
 
a
t
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
o
d
c
i
.
g
o
v
/
c
i
a
/
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
/
f
a
c
t
b
o
o
k
/
i
n
d
e
x
.
h
t
m
l
.
 
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
f
a
c
u
l
t
y
.
h
a
a
s
.
b
e
r
k
e
l
e
y
.
e
d
u
/
a
r
o
s
e
/
h
t
m
l
 
L
o
g
 
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
L
o
g
 
o
f
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
c
i
r
c
l
e
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
c
e
n
t
r
e
s
 
(
u
s
u
a
l
,
 
b
u
t
 
n
o
t
 
a
l
w
a
y
s
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
c
i
t
i
e
s
)
 
i
n
 
a
 
p
a
i
r
 
o
f
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
A
n
d
r
e
w
 
R
o
s
e
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
,
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
l
y
 
f
r
o
m
 
C
I
A
 
F
a
c
t
b
o
o
k
 
 
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
a
b
l
e
 
a
t
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
o
d
c
i
.
g
o
v
/
c
i
a
/
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
/
f
a
c
t
b
o
o
k
/
i
n
d
e
x
.
h
t
m
l
.
 
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
f
a
c
u
l
t
y
.
h
a
a
s
.
b
e
r
k
e
l
e
y
.
e
d
u
/
a
r
o
s
e
/
h
t
m
l
 V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
n
a
m
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
 
 
A
n
t
i
-
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
A
n
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
i
n
g
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
i
s
 
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
d
d
i
n
g
 
1
 
w
h
e
n
:
 
(
1
)
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
a
l
l
o
w
s
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
 
t
o
 
m
a
i
l
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
p
r
o
x
y
 
v
o
t
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
;
 
(
2
)
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
p
r
i
o
r
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
S
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
 
M
e
e
t
i
n
g
;
 
(
3
)
 
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
v
o
t
i
n
g
 
o
r
 
p
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
o
a
r
d
 
o
f
 
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
i
s
 
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
;
 
(
4
)
 
a
n
 
o
p
p
r
e
s
s
e
d
 
 
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
 
i
s
 
i
n
 
p
l
a
c
e
;
 
(
5
)
 
t
h
e
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
t
h
a
t
 
e
n
t
i
t
l
e
s
 
a
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
c
a
l
l
 
f
o
r
 
a
n
 
E
x
t
r
a
o
r
d
i
n
a
r
y
 
S
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
 
M
e
e
t
i
n
g
 
i
s
 
l
e
s
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
o
r
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
t
o
 
1
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
(
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
)
;
 
o
r
 
,
(
6
)
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
p
r
e
e
m
p
t
i
v
e
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
a
n
 
o
n
l
y
 
b
e
 
w
a
v
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
 
v
o
t
e
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
r
a
n
g
e
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
0
 
t
o
 
6
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
9
8
)
.
 
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
a
b
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
i
i
c
g
.
s
o
m
.
y
a
l
e
.
e
d
u
/
d
a
t
a
/
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
s
.
s
h
t
m
l
 
C
r
e
d
i
t
o
r
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
A
n
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
i
n
g
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
o
r
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
i
s
 
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
d
d
i
n
g
 
1
 
w
h
e
n
:
 
(
1
)
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
m
p
o
s
e
s
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
s
u
c
h
 
a
s
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
o
r
s
’
 
c
o
n
s
e
n
t
 
o
r
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
 
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
s
 
t
o
 
f
i
l
e
 
f
o
r
 
r
e
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
;
 
(
2
)
 
s
e
c
u
r
e
d
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
o
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
a
b
l
e
 
t
o
 
g
a
i
n
 
p
o
s
s
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
o
n
c
e
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
h
a
s
 
b
e
e
n
 
a
p
p
r
o
v
e
d
 
(
n
o
 
a
u
t
o
m
a
t
i
c
 
s
t
a
y
)
;
 
(
3
)
 
s
e
c
u
r
e
d
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
o
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
r
a
n
k
e
d
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
s
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
o
f
 
a
 
b
a
n
k
r
u
p
t
 
f
i
r
m
;
 
a
n
d
,
 
(
4
)
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
b
t
o
r
 
d
o
e
s
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
t
a
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
i
t
s
 
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
r
a
n
g
e
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
0
 
t
o
 
4
.
 
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
9
8
)
.
 
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
a
b
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
i
i
c
g
.
s
o
m
.
y
a
l
e
.
e
d
u
/
d
a
t
a
/
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
s
.
s
h
t
m
l
 
L
e
g
a
l
 
O
r
i
g
i
n
 
I
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
g
a
l
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
 
L
a
w
 
o
r
 
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
C
o
d
e
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
.
 
T
h
e
r
e
 
a
r
e
 
f
i
v
e
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
s
:
 
(
1
)
 
E
n
g
l
i
s
h
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
L
a
w
;
 
(
2
)
 
F
r
e
n
c
h
 
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
C
o
d
e
;
 
(
3
)
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
 
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
C
o
d
e
;
 
(
4
)
 
S
c
a
n
d
i
n
a
v
i
a
n
 
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
C
o
d
e
;
 
a
n
d
 
(
5
)
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
i
s
t
/
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
s
t
 
l
a
w
s
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
[
1
9
9
8
]
,
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
l
y
 
f
r
o
m
 
R
e
y
n
o
l
d
s
 
a
n
d
 
F
l
o
r
e
s
 
[
1
9
8
9
]
,
 
C
I
A
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
F
a
c
t
b
o
o
k
 
[
2
0
0
1
]
.
 
 
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
a
b
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
i
i
c
g
.
s
o
m
.
y
a
l
e
.
e
d
u
/
d
a
t
a
/
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
s
.
s
h
t
m
l
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
O
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
o
f
 
B
a
n
k
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
a
t
 
5
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
 
S
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
p
 
1
0
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
i
n
 
a
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
5
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
5
.
 
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
5
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
s
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
h
a
v
i
n
g
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
5
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
.
 
T
h
e
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
o
w
n
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
a
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
b
a
n
k
 
i
s
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
m
u
l
t
i
p
l
y
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
 
i
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
b
a
n
k
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
o
w
n
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
n
 
s
u
m
m
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
[
2
0
0
2
]
,
 
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
a
b
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
i
i
c
g
.
s
o
m
.
y
a
l
e
.
e
d
u
/
d
a
t
a
/
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
s
.
s
h
t
m
l
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
O
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
o
f
 
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
B
a
n
k
s
 
a
t
 
2
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
S
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
p
 
1
0
 
b
a
n
k
s
,
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
b
a
n
k
s
,
 
i
n
 
a
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
2
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
5
.
 
A
 
b
a
n
k
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
i
f
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
i
s
 
l
a
r
g
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
2
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
[
2
0
0
2
]
,
 
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
a
b
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
i
i
c
g
.
s
o
m
.
y
a
l
e
.
e
d
u
/
d
a
t
a
/
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
s
.
s
h
t
m
l
 
B
a
n
k
 
O
v
e
r
h
e
a
d
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
T
h
e
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
a
 
b
a
n
k
’
s
 
o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
a
s
 
a
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
i
t
s
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
i
s
 
o
b
t
a
i
n
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
b
a
n
k
’
s
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
s
h
e
e
t
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
r
e
f
e
r
s
 
t
o
 
1
9
9
5
.
 
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
[
2
0
0
2
]
,
 
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
a
b
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
i
i
c
g
.
s
o
m
.
y
a
l
e
.
e
d
u
/
d
a
t
a
/
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
s
.
s
h
t
m
l
,
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
l
y
 
f
r
o
m
 
 
B
e
c
k
,
 
D
e
m
i
r
g
u
c
-
K
u
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
L
e
v
i
n
e
 
(
2
0
0
1
)
.
 
S
o
u
n
d
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
B
a
n
k
s
 
A
n
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
W
C
R
’
s
 
a
s
s
e
s
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
s
o
u
n
d
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
i
n
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
"
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
u
n
d
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
s
h
e
e
t
s
.
"
 
S
c
a
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
 
t
o
 
7
,
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
s
c
o
r
e
s
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
t
r
o
n
g
e
r
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
.
 
T
h
e
 
s
c
o
r
e
 
r
e
f
e
r
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
9
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
[
2
0
0
2
]
,
 
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
a
b
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
i
i
c
g
.
s
o
m
.
y
a
l
e
.
e
d
u
/
d
a
t
a
/
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
s
.
s
h
t
m
l
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
l
y
 
f
r
o
m
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
F
o
r
u
m
 
(
1
9
9
9
)
.
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
1
9
8
0
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
,
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
l
y
 
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
d
 
b
y
 
B
a
r
r
o
 
a
n
d
 
L
e
e
 
(
2
0
0
1
)
.
 
L
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
 
o
f
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
o
 
s
t
a
r
t
-
u
p
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
T
h
e
 
t
i
m
e
 
i
t
 
t
a
k
e
s
 
t
o
 
o
b
t
a
i
n
 
l
e
g
a
l
 
s
t
a
t
u
s
 
t
o
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
e
 
a
 
f
i
r
m
,
 
i
n
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
d
a
y
s
.
 
A
 
w
e
e
k
 
h
a
s
 
f
i
v
e
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
d
a
y
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
 
m
o
n
t
h
 
h
a
s
 
t
w
e
n
t
y
 
t
w
o
.
 
F
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
I
 
u
s
e
 
t
h
e
 
n
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
l
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
.
 
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
D
j
a
n
k
o
v
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
;
 
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
a
b
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
i
i
c
g
.
s
o
m
.
y
a
l
e
.
e
d
u
/
d
a
t
a
/
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
s
.
s
h
t
m
l
 
 
 
 V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
N
a
m
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
 
 
C
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
 
A
 
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
y
e
a
r
 
2
0
0
0
 
t
h
a
t
 
d
r
a
w
s
 
o
n
 
1
4
 
d
a
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